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PREFACE 
This dissertation is an attempt to estimate how much, in dollar 
values, consumers have lost in well-being as a result of paying higher 
prescription drug prices for many drugs than was necessary. It 
further studies the impact of legislation known as an antisubstitution 
law on the prices of prescription drugs that coQsumers pay. The 
probable effect of the modificatiQn or removal of this law is investi-
gated and specific policy recommendations are made. 
The data for this calculation of the nwelfare loss" were collected 
by mailed questionnaires to all the pharmacies of the State of Oklahoma. 
It was thus possible to undertake this study only if the cooperation of 
the pharmacists of Oklahoma was gained. The responses from most were 
good and their comments and suggestions were very helpful. My sincere 
appreciation is extended to those who cooperated. 
I owe a substantial debt to the adviser of this thesis, Dr. Joseph 
Jadlow, whose patience, interest and assistance were continual. I also 
wish to thank the other members of my committee: Dr. Gerald Lage, who 
has always shown an attitude of helpfulness; Dr. Joseph Klos, whose 
assistance and encouragement have been ever present; Dr. Y. c. Lu for 
his time and effort. 
I also wish to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to Dr. 
Richard Leftwich whose encouragement, support and example have been 
instrumental throughout my doctoral program. In addition, I must thank 
Joyce King for her excellent typing of this paper. 
Finally, I wish t9 thank my wife, Susie, and two daughters, Mary 
Cathryn and Carrie. Their cheer and comfort have sustained my progress. 
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The United States prescription drug·industry has twice in the last 
decade been investigated in lengthy Congressional Hearings for an 
1 alleged lack of competition among drug producers. It is the purpose of 
this study to investigate a specific piece of legislation known as an 
antisubstitution law and view its possible impact upon price competition 
in the prescription drug industry. Where less competition results in 
higher prices of products and smaller quantities purchased, there is a 
loss in economic well-being to consumers. The focus of this study is on 
the antisubstitution law of the State of Oklahoma. The law itself is 
investigated and an attempt is made to measure the possible loss in 
economic welfare to the consumers of Oklahoma. 
Chapter II contains a discussion of the prescription or ethical 
drug industry. It _includes an analysis of the structure of the industry 
and of the conduct of its constituent firms. This chapter also provides 
the perspective of the antisubstitution law and a discussion of the way 
in which the law may serve to impede competition among drug producers. 
Since data for the empirical portion of this study were collected at the 
1 See U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, Administered Prices in the Drug 
Industry, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, and U. S. Senate, Select Committee 
on Small Business, Subcommittee and Monopoly, Hearings, Competititve 
Problems in the Drug Industry, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1967. 
retail or pharmacy level, the relationship between manufacturers of the 
drugs and the pharmacists who dispense them is studied. 
2 
In Chapter III the technique of measuring welfare losses is 
developed. The theoretical foundations of the technique are established 
by presenting a chronological review of the literature. In addition, 
the chapter includes a discussion of previous studies attempting to 
empirically estimate welfare losses resulting from monopoly elements in 
the economy. The chapter lists criticisms which have been.made of these 
studies and points out differences between the present study and earlier 
ones. 
Chapter IV embodies the heart of the empirical portion of this 
study. The welfare loss estimates derived from the data gathered and 
the technique.previously established are adapted to the specific case of 
the ethical drug iQdustry and the results are presented. The data for 
this.study were collected by mailed questionnaires to pharmacists in the 
State of Oklahoma. It was found that.the value of the loss in well-
being to the consumers of the State of Oklahoma on the small sample of 
non-patented drugs is considerable. 
That the.welfare loss discovered can.be partially attributed to the 
presence of the antisubstitution law is.established in Chapter .V. 
Certain conditions wh.ich must. be present for the antisubstitution law to. 
stifl.e competition are shown to exist from representation of attitudinal 
informati~n·collected from pharmacists via questionnaire. 
Chapter V also presents the probable·impact of a professional fee 
system of pricing, a method currently being considered by pharmacists. 
This method is shown to be an impediment to price competition at the 
3 
retail level and can result in an increase in the welfare loss estimates 
already in existence.· 
The findings of this study generally indicate that elimination or 
modification of the existing state antisubstitution laws would likely 
lower prescription drug prices at the manufacturer and the retail or 
pharmacy level and would result in an increase in the economic well-
being of the consumers of prescription drugs. It also concludes that 
the use of a professional fee system of retail pricing of drug products 
would lead to less price competition at .the retail level and a 
concomitant increase in prescription drug prices. 
CHAPTER II 
MANUFACTURERS, RETAILERS, AND COMPETITION 
In order to lay groundwork for analysis which is carried on later 
in this study, various elements of the structure and conduct of the 
ethical drug industry are considered in this chapter. Monopoly pres-
sures on ethical drug prices may arise at the manufacturing and/or the 
retail level. Therefore, it is proper to study both levels and the 
relationships between them. 
In addition to a review of market structure and behavior, this 
chapter describes the legal framework.within which the drug market 
operates. Laws which may affect drug prices are cited and their 
possible effect on economic welfare in general is examined. 
Structure of the Industry 
The first task in viewing the structure.of the ethical drug 
industry is to present the firms composing the industry by their number 
and relative size distribution. This is done on the bases of two cri-
teria for which reliable data are available. The first division is 
based on sales of ethical pharmaceutical products. The second division 
is on the basis of the number of drugs that each firm produces which are 
included on the list of the largest selling 500 drugs in the United 
States according to an annual audit by R. A. Gosselin and Company. The 
purpose of this section is to see if the ethical drug industry is 
dominated by large drug firms which produce and sell their products 
under trade names. 
In 1969 there were 1,300 establishments producing and selling all 
1 types of drugs. Approximately one-half of these firms were engaged in 
5 
the production of propriet~ries and the remaining 650 firms manufactured 
2 ethical drugs. However, 136 firms and their subsidiaries accounted for 
3 ninety-five percent of the ethical drug sales. These firms were the 
members of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, ,a group which 
includes most of the major trade-name producers. Individual sales of 
4 these 136 firms ranged from under $200,000 to over $100 million. 
Furthermore, thirty of.these firms accounted for seventy-one percent of 
5 the entire drug market. 
The description of the size distribution of drug firms on the basis 
of sales can be supplemented with data on prescriptions~ According to 
the N1:ttional Prescription Audit, twenty-four U. S. firms produced 314 
6 of tqe 500 largest selling drugs in 1968. Fifty of these 500 drugs 
were sold by generic name~; although pharmacies buy some of these, 
1 U. S. Department of Commerce, U. ~· Industrial Outlook, 1970 
(Washington, D. c., 1969), p. 178. 
2Ibid. 
3Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Prescription Drug 
Industry Fact Book (Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 1. 
4 David Keifer, "The Drug Houses: Harried But Still Prosperous, 
Part II, The Challenge of Change:in the Drug Industry, 11 Chemical and 
Engineering~' XLII (August 17, 1964), p. 115. 
5 U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Task Force££. 
Prescription Drugs: The Drug Makers and the Drug Distributors 
(Washington, D. C., 1969), p. 9. 
6 R. A. Gosselin & Company, Inc., National Prescription Audit: 
General Information Report (7th ed.; Dedham, Mass., l968), pp. 43-47. 
institutions (e.g.'s, hospitals, Military Medical Supply Agency, etc.) 
purchase the bulk of these outputs. The remaining 450 of the top 500 
drugs were all trade-name products. Of these 450 trade-name drugs, 314 
were sold by only twenty-four firms. 
These twenty-four firms produced 129 of the large~t selling 200 
prescription drugs. Of these 200 drugs, sixtee~ were produced gener-
ically. So, 129 of the 184 trade-name drugs on.the list were sold by 
7 only twenty-four.firms. 
The twenty-four firms mentioned above are relatively large drug 
6 
firms for which reliable.ethical drug sales data are available for 1968. 
Sales data for some of the other large drug sellers are not available in 
usable form because they are divisions of large corporations and ethical 
drug sales are not separated from the other types of sales each firm 
has. Some of the firms also do not furnish .the portion of .their total 
drug sales which .is derived from ethical drugs. An_atte~pt has, there-: 
fore, been made to include only th.ose . firms which release the:l,r ethical 
drug sales data and firms which derive most of their revenues from the 
sales of ethical drugs. 
It is clear that the majority of the largest selling drugs are 
trade-name drugs and that these trade-name drugs are sold by a rela-
tively small number of firms. The twenty-four firms alluded to are 
listed in Table I. These twenty-four firms produce sixty-three percent 
of the largest selling 500 drugs and seventy percent of the trade-name 
drugs on the list. It should be noted that the addition of four firms 
7 The 200 drugs on the list accounted for 67.8 percent of all new, 




RELATIVE SIZE OF TWENTY-FOUR DRUG FIRMS 
(1) (2)* (3)" (4)** (5) 
Sales in 
1968 Assets 
(Millions of (Millions of 
Firm Dollars) Percent of Total Sales Dollars) 
Chas. Pfizer $725 .816 12.8% 7% $260.624 
Warner-Lambert 717.750 12.7% 335.389 
Merck, Sharpe & Dome 583.108 10.3% 7% 298.338 
Eli Lilly & Company 479.618 8.5% 7% 260.624 
Warren-Teed 423.361 7.5% 185.993 
Am. Home Products 379. 964 6. 7% 7% 425.535 
Sterling 366.632 6,5% 220.257 
Abbot Labs, 350.955 6.2% 3% 167.879 
Pittman-Moore. 297.447 5.2% 775.856 
Smith, Kline & French 282.986 5.0% 5% 134.007 
Up john 249.930 4.4% 176.561 
Parke-Davis 250.983 4.4% 244.608 
Squibb 238.980 4.2% 4% 254.293 
Schering 179. 099 3.2% 106.469 
Bristol-Myers 178.633 3.2% 307.143 
G. D. Searle 147.724 2.6% 3% 97.479 
Richardson-Merrel 123.114 2.2% 134.737 
Baxter 122.153 2.2% 59.571 
A.H. Robins 115.428 2.0% 3% 50.690 
W. H. Rorer 114.010 2.0% 59.571 
Carter-Wallace 84.944 1.5% 47.827 
Syntex 73.752 1.3% 52.658 
Massengill 19.870 .4% 7.574 
Alcon 15.748 .3% 6.570 
*Source: Moody's.Industrial Manual (New, York, 1960). 
**Source: Personal Communication, Arthur D. Little, Inc., May 15, .1970. 
8 
for which reliable ethical drug sales is not available would boost 
the latter percentage to seventy-six percent. 
Total sales of ethical drugs were $5.7 billion for 1968. Market 
shares as a percent of these total sales are listed in column three of 
Table I. For comparison, market shares calculated by Arthur D. Little, 
Inc., are placed in column four. From the table, it is clear that these 
twenty-four firms control a large share of the ethical drug business. 
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) reports that, in 
1968, the largest ethical drug firm captured seven percent of the market 
8 while the largest ten had fifty-one percent of ethical drug sales. In 
terms of new, noncompounded prescriptions, a single firm had 8.2 percent 
of the market, The first five companies had 31.6 percent, the first ten 
9 had 51.9 percent. These figures roughly approximate the data presented 
here on market shares by sales. 
From the above findings it is evident that the large drug 
manufacturers hold a substantial share of the prescription drug market; 
in terms of both sales revenues and the volume of prescriptions, they 
dominate the prescription drug market, Moreover, it is clear that 
trade-name drugs mainly marketed by these large firms account for a 
major proportion of the prescription market. 
Unfortunately, information and data on the small drug producers is 
scarce. Over 400 of the 650 U. S. ethical drug firms are relatively 
small.and are often labeled as "the generic producers", although they 
8Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Rx Pharmaceutical 
Industry Operations, Annual Survey Report, 12.§.§..-1969 (Washington, D. C., 
1969), p. 6. 
9 Gosselin, p. 36. 
10 do, in some cases, sell their products under trade names. Few of 
these firms conduct research and hold patents on their products. How-
ever, they do provide an additional source of potential competition to 
the larger.manufacturers on unpatented products. The companies' sales 
11 in thts group ordinarily range from one to ten million dollars. 
The Relevant Market 
9 
The picture drawn above of concentration and the composition of the 
drug industry is in~dequate to determine the degree of competition in 
the industry. The above evidence gives a picture of overall concentra-
tion .whereas the more relevant concept for economic analysis is that of 
industry concentration -- with the "industry" defined on the basis of 
cross elasticity of demand. A particular drug is obviously no.t a good 
substitute on the demand side for any other drug. 
Ethical drugs may be classified in a number of ways. The major 
breakdown of drugs is by therapeutic category. However, certain contra-
dictions may prohibit the use of some.drugs if others are already being 
taken. Among drugs in a certain therapeutic category there still exists 
a degree of substitutability. Even.though this is true, drugs in a 
single therapeutic category may differ by potency, toxicity and number 
and nature.of adverse reactions. The point to be made here is that for 
any particular drug there is a substitute, although it may be a rela-
tively poor one. Certainly, between therapeutic classes the degree of 
substitutability is negligible. 
10 u. S. Department of Health, Eq.ucation and WelfaI'.e; p. 9. 
11Ibid. 
10 
A relevant drug market then; from an economist's standpoint, is a 
therapeutic category which includes drugs with varying degrees of 
substitutability, The demand curve for a particular drug would not be 
perfectly inelastic, although the demand curve for an entire therapeutic 
class might be. Thus, the price .elasticity of the demand curve for a 
particular drug would depend upon the willingness of doctors to pre-
scribe it, and upon their knowledge of other drugs .in the class, The 
degree of elasticity .would also depend on the various other factors 
(adverse reactions, etc,) mentio~ed above.and the consumer's willingness 
and ability to have a prescription filled. 
Cost Conditions 
The actual costs of producing ethical drugs is a closely-guarded 
trade secret. However, the nature of the production process and the .. 
limit.ed volumes in which individual drugs are produced give definite 
indications that constant returns to scale, accompanied .by constant 
costs, are present in.a large part of the industry's production, 
The two leading therapeutic classes by new and refill presc'ription 
12 sales in 1968 were antibiotics and hormones, in that order, Batch 
methods predominate in their manufacture. In order to increase output, 
the firm must add one or more fermentation vats and these will be 
identical to those already in use. This implies constant returns to 
scale. 13 
12 Gosselin, p, 10. 
13 Henry Steele, "Monopoly & Competition in the Ethical Drugs 
Industry," Journal of .Law~ Economics, V (1962), p. 134, 
11 
On the basis of this sort of information, it appears that.constant 
costs are present to a large extent in the drug industry. This apparent 
lack of economies of scal~s leads one to the conclusion that smaller 
drug firms face approximately the same cost conditions that the larger 
firms do, As is pointed out lat~r, the possibility that large manufac-
turers face higher cost conditions t~an small producers would serve to 
reinforce the findings of this study. 
Conduct of the.Firms 
The conduct of firms in the ethical drug industry has been directed 
mainly at product differentiation among drugs. The pricing policies 
of the larger firms have been ones of maintaining excess profits, part 
of which are used to further enhance their market positions. The prod-
uct differentiation policies of the large firms are well documented and 
may be summarily separated, although the two practices are closely 
coordinated, as (1) research and development practices and (2) promo-
tional practices. 
14 Rand D Practices 
Ethical drugs are "sold" to an intermediate consumer in the person 
of a medical doctor. Thus, to differentiate drugs, they must appear 
14see William S. Comanor, "Research & Competitive Product.Differ-
entiation ,in the Pharmaceutical Industry in the U. s., 11 Economica, XXXI 
(1964), pp. 372-384; "The Drug Industry & Medical Research:. The Econom-
ics of the Kefauver Committee Investigations," Journal of Business of 
University of Chicago, XXXIX (January, 1966), pp. 12-18; "Research & 
Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Review of Economic.s 
and.Statistics, XLVII (May, 1965), pp. 182-190; and."The Economics of 
Researchand Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry" (unpub. Ph.D. 
dissertatiot1-, Harvard University, 1963). 
12 
physically different. Research laboratories offer an excellent device 
to accomplish this; end. If, through research, a new.product Cl;in be 
developed, a patent can be obtained on this product, thus conferring a 
monopoly position to the firm holding the drug patent. In 1961, it was 
estimated that two-thirds of all prescription sales were for patented 
15 drugs. 
Amount. To engage in this type of research for the purpose of 
improving a firm's market position, the firm must be able to invest a 
considerable sum in th.e form of .. a research staff and facilities. Funds 
for research.in the drug industry come almost wholly from industry 
16 sources, only four percent coming from Federal contracts in 1966. 
Thus, an important source of .these funds is a firm's profits. 
Profits are not scarce in the pharmaceutical industry. According 
to the Fortune 500 Survey, pharmaceuticals ranked first in.return on 
invested capital with a 17.9 percent return in 1968 and second in return 
17 on sales with a 9.0 percent return. Three drug manufacturers ranked 
in the top ten firms in tqe U. S. for return on sales; Searle with an 
18.5 percent return on sales, Merck with 15.9 percent .and Smith, Kline 
18 and French with 15.0 percent. 
15 Comanor, "Research.& Competitive .Product Differentiation ••• , 11 
p. 379. 
16Pharmaceutic~l Manufacturers Association, Prescription Drug 
Industry ~Book (Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 38. 
17Fortune (July, 1969), pp. 185-186. 
18Ibid, 
13 
In 1968, all firms in the industry spent $521 million fQr research 
19 and development.. In 1967, the firms spent $476 million which was 
10.95 percent of sales. 20 
Nature. The nat~re of research conducteµ in the U. S. drug firms' 
research facilit_ies has been primarily directed towatd the development 
of new products rather than developing new and more efficient methods 
21 of producing established products. As a result, the efforts made 
toward reducing costs of production have been relat~vely small~ 
Instead, then, of reducing costs in order to increase the level of 
profits, new products have been developed. These new products may be 
patented for seventeen years and monopoly profits can be reaped for this 
period if not, as will _be seen, longer. 
Monopoly positions are enviable, especially by t~ose.who are unable 
to achieve them. In _the e~hical drug industry there have been many 
firms who have not been able to use the patent system to attain monopoly 
power. since they do not have the initial funds to begin the research and 
development establishment necessary for such ventures. These smaller, 
less-profitable firms must rely on the production and sale of unpatent-
able drugs or drugs whose patents have expired. 
Promotional Practices 
When the R & D establishments of large drug concerns discover or 
19 U, S. Department -of Comrnerc-e, p. 1-78. , 
20Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association~· '.Prescription Drug 
Industry~ Book, p, 2, 
. 21 
Comanor, "Research & Competitive Product Differentiation ••• ," 
p, 377. 
14 
invent a new drug, the task remains of promoting it to doctors who 
decide which drugs patients should have. Here, as in research and 
development, the large drug producers have undertaken massive efforts. 
Amount. There are today approximately 200,000 physicians in the 
United States. Since ethical drugs are not promoted to the public at 
large, an intensive promotional campaign is directed at this much 
smaller number of prescribers, 
Ethical drugs are promoted to physicians by advertisements in 
periodicals, professional journals, postal flyers and by personal.visits 
of detail men (i.e., drug salesmen). In 1966, it was estimated that 
drug producers spent about $600 million per year on promotion of their 
22 products. This means approximately $3,000 per year per physician was 
spent on promotional efforts. One estimate for 1968 was.put at $4,500 
23 per year per physician. As a percent of sales, marketing expenditure 
24 estimates run from fourteen percent to nearly thirty-three percent. · 
25 There are approximately 15,000 detail men.employed by drug firms. 
Nature. When a new drug is developed by a large drug manufacturer, 
it is assigned three names: (1) the chemical name which is often long, 
(2) the generic name which is.the common name for the drug and is often 
long and difficult to pronounce and (3) the trade name which is usually 
short, catchy and is unique to a particular manufacturer even though 
another firm may be licensed to produce and sell the identical drug. 
22u. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, p. 28. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid, p. 27. 
25 Bernard Barber, Drugs and Society (New York, 1967), p, 60. 
15 
When the drug has been assigned these names and after it has been 
approved by the Food.and Drug Administration, the drug is promoted to 
physicians by its trade name only. Even after the patent has expired on 
a drug, physicians may continue to prescribe by the trade name. This 
fact can have important economic consequences. These consequences will 
come under scrutiny later. 
Relationship Between.Manufacturers 
and Pharmacies 
Since the data for this study is gathered from retail sources 
rather than directly from manufacturers, the relationship existing 
between.the manufacturers and the retailers must be studied. Price dif-
ferentials between two brands of the same drug may differ depending upon 
whether producers' prices or retailer~' prices are compared. The 
retailing units for ethical drugs are, of course, the local pharmacies. 
Drug manufacturers exert an influence on drug prices from both the 
supply and the demand side of the picture. 
The Direct Route 
Pharmacies may purchase the drugs they sell directly from the 
manufacturer or they may follow the less direct route of purchasing the 
drugs through a wholesaler. Both methods are used to some extent. 
The distribution of drugs from manufacturers to wholesalers has 
been declining. In 1954• 58.6 percent of manufacturers• drug sales were 
26 
made to wholesalers. By 1965 that percentage had fallen to 48.4. In 
26Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, p. 12. 
16 
27 1968, 47.5 percent were sales to wholesalers. 
On the other hand, manufacturers' sales directly to pharmacies have 
been relatively stable. Between 1954 and 1965 the percent of manufac-
turers' drug sales to retailers rose from 29.4 percent to 30.25 
28 percent. In 1968, because of an increasing percentage of sales to 
institutions, this percentage dropped slightly to 29.2. 29 Thus, the 
relative decline in importance of wholesalers appears to have resulted 
from increased institutional purchasing of drugs directly from manufac-
turers rather than from increased buying by pharmacies directly from 
manufacturers. 
The Indirect Route 
The drugs that pharmacists must stock in their inventories is 
directly dependent on the drugs which physicians are currently prescrib-
ing. Pharmacists must dispense the particular drug, even by a specific 
manufacturer, that a physician prescribes by brand name. In most 
instances, it is illegal for a pharmacist to exercise discretion among 
drugs£!. manufacturers. 
The role of manufacturers in affecting the demand side of the 
picture is through their promotional efforts. Since physicians are an 
important element in determining the composition of demanq for prescrip-
tion drugs, their thoughts and emotions are the primary target of 
27Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association,~ Pharmaceutical 
Industry Operations ••• , p. 10. 
28 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Prescription Drug ••• , 
p. 12. 
29 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Rx Pharmaceutical 
Industry Operations ••• , p. 10. 
ethical drug promotion. If a manufacturer is able to persuade 
physicians of a drug's therapeutic efficacy and the danger or dubious 
nature of non brand-name drugs, it is likely that the brand name 
manufacturer's drug will be the one prescribed most often. 
17 
When a drug is prescribed, pharmacists must dispense that 
particular drug and, if a trade-name is used in the prescription, the 
drug dispensed must be by that particular manufacturer or, in the event 
the pharmacy does not.stock that brand, the patient must be referred to 
another pharmacy. Many of the drugs produced by large manufacturers are 
combination products of patented and unpatented drugs and, in some 
cases, the patented trade-name drug may have a generic counterpart or it 
may be available from a low-cost, brand-name producer,. 
Noticeably, the consideration of price is absent in this entire 
sequence. 
or of the 
Physicians are, in many cases, unaware of the prices of drugs 
30 availability of lower-cost, equivalent (identical) drugs. 
The pharmacist, on the other hand, who is aware of prices and the 
availability of generic equivalents is unable to make practical use of 
such knowledge. 
There may also be an element of inefficiency involved in the nature 
of pharmacists' inventories. Since quantity and volume discounts are 
often available on larger purchases of drug shipments, a cost savings 
could be achieved by allowing pharmacists to stock larger quantities of 
certain manufacturers' drugs instead of forcing them to have on hand a 
smaller stock of each manufacturer's brand of a particular drug. To the 
30 Steele, p. 133. 
18 
extent these cost savings are passed on to the consumer in the form of 
lower prices a gain in consumer welfare may be.the result. 
Role of the State Board of Pharmacy 
Pharmacies and pharmacists are, for reasons of public health, 
supervised by state and federal regulations. Federal laws regarding the 
practices of pharmacists are directed mainly at drug abuse. The laws 
which most directly interfere with the operation of the market mechanism 
arise at the state level. The state agency appointed to regulate the 
practice of pharmacy is the state board of pharmacy. Therefore, it 
would seem germane to make a cursory examination of the structure and 
activities of this body. Since this study is particularly concerned 
with the State of.Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Board of Pharmacy will 
primarily be considered. Although this will be the case, the activities 
of state boards of pharmacy do not substantially differ and the Oklahoma 
31 State Board of Pharmacy can be viewed as a representative board. 
The Oklahoma State Board of Pharmacy consists of five persons who 
are members of the Oklahoma Pharmaceutical Association and have 
practiced pharmacy for at least five years. The members are appointed 
by the Governor from a list of n~es elected by members of the Oklahoma 
Pharmaceutical Association. 
The Board, in regulating the practice of Pharmacy and the sale of 
drugs, accepts or rejects all applications for the licensing of phar-
macists and/or pharmacies. Therefore, it establishes the standards and 
31 For a detailed examination of differences among state boards of 
pharmacy see F. Marion Fletcher, Market Restraints !a, the Retail Drug 
Industry (Philadelphia, 1967). 
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qualifications, including education, training, and moral character of 
all would-be pharmacists and establishes the physical requirements for 
pharmacies. All necessary inspections, hearings, etc., pursuant to the 
enforcement of these regulati~ns are conducted by the Board. Specific 
requirements which affect the level of drug prices will be viewed with 
regard to their economic impact later. 
The Antisubstitution Law 
The nature and economic implications of the antisubstitution law 
are presented in this section. The manner in which the law came into 
existence, the possible economic effect of the law, and other laws and 
regulations which have economic significance are discussed here. 
History 
The Oklahoma antisubstitution law was enacted in 1961. The law 
itself states: 
It shall be unlawful for any pharmacist being requested to 
sell, furnish, or compound any drug, medicine, chemical or 
other pharmaceutical preparation, by prescription or other-
wise, to substitute or cause to be substituted therefore, 
without authority of the prescriber or purchaser, any other 
drug, medicine, chemical, or pharmaceutical preparation.32 
Substitution, as the physical act was originally conceived, meant 
to substitute literally one generic drug for another. For example, if 
a pharmacist received a prescription for penicillin, it would be illegal 
substitution if he dispensed another antibiotic such as tetracycline. 
The practice of this type of substitution obviously could have adverse 
repercussions. With substitution defined in this way, the pharmacist 
32 Oklahoma Session Laws, 1961; Title 58, Chap. 8, Section 21. 
20 
is obliged under an antisubstitution law tQ dispense the drug which the 
physician has prescribed. Substitution, under this definition, has been 
occurring for hundreds of years, the first historical reference being 
made to it in 880 B. c. 33 
The above definition of substitution was used for many years until, 
in the early 1950's, some firms of the ethical drug industry sought to 
have the definition enlarged. In the words of a prominent physician: 
In 1955 the National Pharmaceutical Council was kind enough to 
give to all the world a new definition of substitution. Sub-
stitution previously was understood to be to substitute one 
drug for another. But in 1955 the National Pharmaceutical 
Council, as part of its pragram1 enlarged this definition and· 
has been pushing it ever since. 4 
The "new" definition, as it was espoused by the National 
Pharmaceutical Council (a group of twenty-two trade-name firms), was 
that substitution meant the substituting of one.brand of a.drug for 
another brand, even.though the drug involved was physically identical in 
each case. In other words• one manufacturer's brand of, say, 
meprobamate could not be substituted for another manufacturer's brand 
even though in each instance the drug is still meprobamate. 
The National Pharmaceutical Council's campaign to get this 
definition of substitution accepted by state boards of pharmacy is 
described in detail in the hearings on the drug industry conducted by 
33 Statement.of Newell Stewart, Executive Vice-President, National 
Pharmaceutical Council, Inc., in U. S. Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on ·Antitrust and Monopoly, Hearings, Administ-
~ Prices!£~ Drug Industry, 86th Cong., 2d sees., 1960, PP• 8285-
8288. 
34 Statement of Dr. August H. Groeschel, Associate Director, The 
New York Hospital, New York in U.S. Senate, Administered Prices •• ~, 
p. 11576. 
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Senator Estes Kefauver in the late 1950's.35 The success of its 
campaign is evidenced by the fact that in 1954 only about eight states 
had antisubstitution laws and these were written under the 11old 11 defini-
36 tion of substitution. At present, forty-seven states have anti-
substitution laws and the practice of substituting is prohibited by 
37 professional ethics in two others. In addition to this fact, the 
American Druggist placed the rate of substitution in 1957 at 4.3 percent 
compared with 14.7 percent in 1953, a substantial decline. 38 Appar-
ently, substitution, as defined for determination of.this percentage, 
includes both types of substitution. 
The rigorous efforts of the National Pharmaceutical Council 
included the compilation of a state-by-state list of the situation 
39 regarding the legality of substitution in each state. The list was 
dated January, 1958. Regarding Oklahoma, it was stated in the list 
that: 
There is no particular authority in the law but the Board will 
cooperate to the best of its ability. The Board will cite a 
pharmacist to appear who is guilty of substituting. The Board 
would like to have some shopping done in one state to deter-
mine the extent of the problem.40 · 
35Ibid., p. lff. 
36Ibid., p. 11714. 
37 , 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, p. 80. 
38 Robert A. Hardt, Journal of the American Pharmaceutical. 
Association, Practical Pharmacy Ediilin, XVIII, February, 1957, repro-
duced in U. s. Senate, Administered Prices ••• , pp. 11756-11760. 
39Exhibit 405 of Statement of Newell Stewart in U. S. Senate, 
Administered Prices ••• , p, 11802. 
40Ibid., p. 11807. 
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It was assumed in a National Pharmaceutical Council memorandum 
dated December 19, 1955 that the incidence of substitution in.Oklahoma 
41 was not signif~cant. · This suggests that there would have been little 
substitution without the law since the practice of substitution was not 
prevalent even before its enactment. However, since 1955, much informa-
tion concerning generic equivalency has come to light and pharmacists' 
attitudes regarding substitution may have changed or the threat of legal 
consequences may have always been present. 
The legality of antisubstitution laws of various states has been 
upheld many times. There has been one notable exception. In the State 
of Michigan, Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Carl M. Weideman held that 
substituting the generic drug prednisone for the trade~name version 
Meticorten was not substitution as defined in the law since chemically 
42 and by assay the drugs were identical. However, the meaning of this 
decision was not clear because, in this instance, the prescribing 
physician had given prior approval to the substitution. 
In addition to rulings under antisubstitution laws, it has been 
held in at. least two cases .that substitution of a generic drug for a 
trade-name drug is a violation of the manufacturer's trademark under the 
Lanham Act of 1946 and; therefore, constitutes unfair competition on 
43 the part of the pharmacist who substitutes. 
41Ibid., p. 11818. 
42Ibid., p. 11761. 
43R. G. Kedersha, "The·Impact of Brand Name·Prescription Products 
on the Traditional Practices of High Prescription Volume Pharmacies in 
Northern New Jersey: A Study of the Brand Name vs. Generic Name 
Prescription Product Problem" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, New York 
University, 1964), p. 38. 
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Effect on Competition 
If the type of market conduct described above.involving large-scale 
promotional and R & D practices of the dominant drug manufacturers is 
continued, the antisubstitution law can help these firms maintain monop-
oly positions for certain drugs. In order for the antisubstitution law 
to be responsible for any welfare loss resulting from monopoly the 
following conditions must be present: 
(1) Some drug firms must be marketing the drug under trade names. 
If all drugs were marketed under generic names alone, the antisubstitu-
tion law would be inconsequential in stifling competition. 
(2) There must be no patent currently in.effect for the drug. A 
patent conveys a monopoly position to the firm holding the patent on a 
particular drug. Substitution would be impossible since there would be 
no available substitutes. An exception to this condition exists when 
the patent is licensed to other manufacturers or if the drug i~ sold in 
bulk to other manufacturers to be repackaged and sold under their own 
trade names or by generic name. 
(3) Some physici~ns must be prescribing drugs, which have generic 
equivalents, by trade name. If .all drugs were prescribed by generic 
name then the choice of the manufacturers would be left to the pharma-
cist although it is possible for the consumers to exert some influence 
in the decision by "shopping around." This discretionary power would 
also extst in the absence of an antisubstitution law. 
(4) Pharmacists must be willing and able to substitute generic 
drugs or less expensive trade-name drugs for higher-priced trade-name 
drugs. Pharmacists, upon.receiving a prescription for a trade-name drug 
must.be willing to substitute a lower-priced generic equivalent 
24 
otherwise the absence of an antisubstitution law alone would not 
engender price competition among brands of a drug. Some people, such as 
Newell Stewart of the National Pharmaceutical Council, have argued that, 
"For a pharmacist to impose his judgment upon that of .the physician is 
44 assuming a responsibility he is not qualified to assume." Others 
think differently. This question is examined more fully in Chapter V. 
In addition to the pharmacist's willingness to substitute lower-
priced generic equivalents, he must have the ability to do so. The 
ability of a pharmacist to substitute a lower-priced generic equivalent 
upon receipt of a trade-name prescription is directly dependent upon the 
pharmacist's inventory. Since many physicians today do prescribe by 
trade name, it may be that pharmacists do not stock generic-name drugs. 
In this event, substitution could not occur. The nature of pharmacists' 
inventories is explored in Chapter V. 
The above conditions must be present for a firm to maintain a 
monopoly position for a drug as a result of the antisubstitution law 
and product differentiation. The first condition, from evidence already 
presented, is present to a considerable extent in the ethical drug 
industry. 
The second condition certainly is present in a number of cases. In 
a recent Task Force study, a list was compiled of the 409 most fre-
quently prescribed drugs for individuals sixty-five years of age and 
older. 45 Of these 409 drugs, 293 were still under patent and thirty 
products were available and actually dispensed under generic name. This 
44u. s. Senate, Administered Prices ••• , p. 11699. 
45u. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,~ Force on 
Prescription Drugs: The Drug Users, pp. 38-57. 
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left eighty-six drugs which were ordinarily sold under trade names but 
which were also available under their generic names. Therefore, there 
are several high-selling drugs which satisfy the second condition. 
The third condition is one of the topics which is discussed in 
Chapter V. Evidence is presented in that chapter on this subject. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of an antisubstitution law in reducing 
competition or the possibility of its elimination increasing competition 
turns on several empirical questions. It is the purpose of Chapter V to 
investigate the effectiveness of the antisubstitution law. 
Other Considerations 
Besides the antisubstitution law, there exist other factors which 
may affect competition and the level of retail drug price differentials, 
especially between trade-name and generic-name drugs. The central 
elements are those of a legal nature and those which arise from the 
professional orientation of pharmacists. 
The legal constraints in all the states on competition have been 
46 exhaustively studied elsewhere. It should be noted here, however, 
that a particular impairment to competition via price is the prohibition 
in Oklahoma of any advertising of prescription drug prices by pharma-
47 cists. This constraint could be especially damaging if, in the 
absence of an antisubstitution law, some pharmacists were willing to 
substitute while others were not •. Then, only those individuals who are 
on maintenance drugs (i.e., those who repeatedly have their prescription 
46 See F. Marion Fletcher, Market Restraints. 
47oklahoma State Board of Pharmacy, Oklahoma State Laws Pertaining 
!.£.~Practice of Pharmacy (Oklahoma City: 1969), p. 26. 
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refilled) could gain the full benefit of substitution since they would 
have the opportunity to. 11 shop around." 
There has been a lasting concern for several years among 
pharmacists that pharmacy should be upgraded from the level of merchants 
to the status of a profession. In the 1961 Oklahoma legislation, phar-
48 macy is declared to be a profession. This professional orientation 
has resulted in pharmacists frowning on almost any kind of competition, 
especially on the basis of priceo This seems to be a general feeling 
among pharmacists and, to some extent, indicates why pharmacists oppose 
a reduction in drug prices if there is to be a concomitant loss in drug 
quality. However, the professional fee system, which is consistent with 
the movement of pharmacy toward a true profession, offers hope for a 
smaller vested interest in dispensing the most expensive drugs. Under 
the professional fee system, a constant amount would be charged for the 
filling of a prescription regardless of the cost of the drugs sold. The 
system currently in use is the standard percentage markup on cost. The 
professional fee system, the extent of its current use and the economic 
implications of.its use are explained in Chapter V. 
This chapter has attempted to place in perspective the antisubsti-
tution law in the overall fabric of the ethical drug industry and its 
system of distribution. This chapter, then, has described the source of 
the welfare loss which is computed in Chapter IV. 
48Ibid,, p, 6. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 
The estimation of welfare loss which is made in Chapter IV is 
based on the concept of consumer's surplus. For this reason, the 
literature concerning the development of this concept is reviewed in 
this chapter. In addition, the mechanics involved in the estimation of 
a welfare loss are discussed. This discussion includes derivations of 
the formulae which are used to make such an estimate. , 
The Concept of a.Welfare Loss 
The first description of the concept of consumer's surplus is 
1 credited to a French engineer named Jules Dupuit. Dupuit made a dis~ 
tinction between value in use and value in exchange as had Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo. Dupuit thus offered as a measurement of utility the 
2 maximum sacrifice a consumer would be willing to make to obtain a good. 
Of course, the economist who.popularized the concept of consumer's 
surplus was Alfred Marshall in his Principles of Economics. Marshall 
sought to examine the question of how the price of a good was related to 
1 R. W. Pfouts, "A Critique of.Some Recent Contributions to the 




the utility derived from that good.3 He describes consumer's surplus as 
"The excess of the price which he (the consumer) would be willing to pay 
rather than go without it (the good), over that which he actually does 
pay. He states that this surplus can be measured by the area 
under the demand curve of a consumer and above the price the consumer 
actually pays. Marshall had, unfortunately, assumed cardinal utility, 
a constant marginal utility of money, and ignored the effect of related 
goods in deriving this measure. As is indicated below, all of these 
assumptions are unnecessary. 
The spate of literature which later arose in regard to the concept 
of consumer's surplus was not, however, mainly concerned with the 
assumptions which Marshall had made, but with Marshall's inconsistency 
between his definition of consumer's surplus and the measurement 
technique he had described. They obviously relate to different concepts 
since the definition refers to an all-or-none situation, whereas the 
measurement technique involves the area under a Marshallian demand 
curve. 
Hick's Contributions 
J, R. Hicks saw important properties of consumer's surplus which 
5 fit neatly into the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of welfare economics, 
According to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a movement from one.state to 
3 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th edition, (New York, 
1950), p, 124. 
4Ibid. 
5 
J, R, Hicks, "The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus," Review 
of Economic Studies, VIII (1940-41), pp, 108-116. 
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another is an improvement if those who gain from the move are able to 
compensate those who lose so that they are no worse off than before. 
Hicks used what he termed the compensating variation to determine the 
extent of gains and losses of a consumer resulting from a price change. 
The compensating variation is the amount of income which must be taken 
away from an individual after a fall in the price of a good to make the 
individual no better off than he was before the price fall. Hicks noted 
that the measurement of consumer's surplus under a market demand curve 
tells nothing about the distribution of the gains from which gainers 
6 could compensate the losers. Hicks saw special importance in the 
concept for partial welfare analysis. 7 
Even.with Hicks' rehabilitation of consumer's surplus and the 
abandonment of the assumption of the constancy of the marginal utility 
of money, it remained for A, Henderson to point out.the inconsistency of 
definitions used by Marshall and Hicks, respectively. As Henderson 
states: 
Marshall's definition corresponds to the amount the consumer 
would be willing to pay, if he could not get any of the 
commodity otherwise, for the opportunity to buy, at the exist-
ing price, the amount which he is in fact buying, whereas 
Hicks' definition refers to the amount which the individual 
would be willing to pay, if he had to, for the opportunity to 
buy the commodity in whatever quantities he wishes.8 
The total dollar amount resulting from the use of each of these 




8 A. Henderson, "Consumer's Surplus and the Compensating Variation," 
Review of Economic Studies, VIII (1940-41), pp. 117-121. 
The compensating variation (Hicks) is larger than 
(Marshall's) consumer's surplus, except in the case of infe-
rior goods, because a license to buy any desired amount is 9 
more valuable than a license to buy only a specified amount. 
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Henderson goes on to say, however, that, in practice, these differences 
are only a fine point and, given difficulties of measurement, there will 
be little actual difference between them. 
Hicks soon realized the relevance of Henderson's statements and 
later generalized on Henderson's arguments. It was noted that a dif-
ferent measure was obtained depending upon whether a price rise or a. 
price fall was considered and from where on the indifference map an 
individual began. As a result, four separate measures of consumer's 
10 surplus were found. 
David Winch has neatly summarized Hick's measures verbally as: 
(1) the compensating surplus, or the amount of money which 
the consumer would have to lose, after committing himself to 
the purchase of that amount which he would choose to purchase· 
after the price fall if no adjustment to his income were made, 
in order to have him just.as well off as he was before the 
price fall, 
(2) the compensating variation, or the amount of money the 
consumerwould have to lose, before committing himself to the 
amount of his purchase after the price fall, in order to have 
him just as well off as before the price fall, 
(3) the equivalent variation, or the amount of money the 
consumer would have to gain in the absence.of the price 
fall, before committ~ng himself to the amount of his purchases, 
in order to make him as well off as he would be with the price 
fall and no adjustment in income, and 
(4) the equivalent surplus, or the amount of money which the 
consumer would have to gain in the absence of either price 
9 Pfouts, p. 320. 
10see J. R. Hicks, "The Four Consumer's Surpluses," Review of. 
Economic.Studies, XI (1943-44), pp. 31-41, and "The Generalized Theory 
of Consumer's Surplus," Review of Economic Studies, XIII (1945-46), pp. 
68-74. ~ . 
fa;l.1 or money adjustment, in order. to have him just as well 
off as he would be with no mortey adjustment after the price 
fa11. ll 
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Hicks' def ice to illustrate the differences amon~ these measures is v 
12 that shown in Figure 1, Quantitit~s of a single good X are measured 
by the abscissa while the price of X is measured by .the ordinate. The 
curve AB is the uncompensated demand curve or the demand curve of an 
individual as it is ordinarily thought of, Thus at a price of OH, OF 
units of good X will be taken. If, then, the price of.X falls to OK, 
KB units will be taken. If, however, when the price of good X falls to 
OK an amount of income is taken from the consumer so that he is no bet-
ter off than before the price fall, he will not take KB units of X at 
price OK, but he will take some smaller amount, say Kb. The amount of 
income which must be removed to place the consumer at his initial level 
of satisfaction is called the compensating variation. It is measured 
by the area HAbK under.the compensated demand curve AC, Therefore, the 
consumer's level.of satisfaction is the same at point A as it is at b. 
In order to find the compensating surplus, the consumer must 
already have selected his level of purchases after the price fall which 
in the illustration given is amount OG. Hicks divides the increment in 
surplus resulting from the price fall into two parts, The increment in 
surplus on the units being purchased before the price fall and the 
increment in surplus from the purchase of the additional units after the 
good's price has fallen. On the OF units purchased before the price 
11oavid M, Winch, "Consumer's Surplus and Compensation Principles,n 
American Economic Review, LV (1965), p. 396. 
12 J, R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory (London, 1956), p. 100, 
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fall there is a gain in surplus equal to the cost difference the 
consumer pays and is measured by the area of the rectangle HANK. The 
increment in surplus arising from the additional FG units purchased is 
measured by the marginal valuation of each unit under the compensated 
marginal valuation curve AbC minus the cost of those additional.units,· 
It is thus the difference between the areas AFGC and NFGB, which is also 
the difference between triangles ANb and CBb. The total increment then 
is the difference between the areas HAbK and the triangle CBb. Thus, 
the compensating surplus is smaller than the compensating variation in 
income by the area of the triangle CBb. 
0 
Figure 1, Compensated and Uncompensated Demand 
Curves 
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The equivalent variation is measured in a similar manner except the 
question involved is what amount of income would be necessary in the 
absence of a price fall to move the consumer to a level of satisfaction 
which he could have attained if the price fall had actually occurred. 
The compensated demand curve through B now becomes the relevant one. 
since any point on this curve is at the same level of satisfaction as at 
point B, This curve is labeled DaB. The equivalent variation i~ income 
then becomes HaBK, since·if this amount of income were given to the con-. 
sumer in the absence of a price fall he could attain the same level of 
satisfaction as when the price fall actually occurred. Using the same 
line of reasoning as above, the equivalent surplus thus becomes the area 
of the rectangle HANK plus the area of the triangle DNB. 
It is readily apparent from the diagram that the order of 
magnitudes of the various measures is that·given originally in the order 
of definitions, i.e., in descending order these are the equivalent 
surplus, the equivalent variation, the compensating variation and.the 
compensating surplus. The Marshallian measure is the area under the 
uncompensated demand curve and is smaller than the equivalent variation 
and surplus and larger than the compensating variation and surplus. 
The,above exposition is a cursory one since Hicks has already 
13 described his concept in detail elsewhere. However, it was necessary 
to set.out Hicks' measures in order.to prepare for the discussion below 
of other contributions in the literature. 
13rbid., chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 
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Winch's Contributions 
A real contribution and the foundation on which this study is based 
14 was made by D. M. Winch. Hicks used his measure to determine the 
addition to a consumer's satisfaction under the Kaldor-Hicks welfare 
criterion. This criterion has· received much criticism since it does not 
require that compensation actually be paid. If compensation were made, 
the move would be an improvement even under the Pareto criterion because 
everyone would be better off than before. Winch's paper examines the 
measurement of consumer's surplus in situations where compensation is 
not actually made~ He agrees that.Hicks changed the triangular measure 
15 given by Marshall to fit his definition. Winch, however, sought to 
change the definition given by Marshall.to fit the triangle. 
By using the same diagram as Hicks, which is reproduced in Figure 
2, it can be shown that the Marshallian measure of the area of the 
triangle under the uncompensated demand curve is the relevant one for 
welfare decisions where compensation will not actually be paid. In 
Figure 2, DD represents the uncompensated demand curve, AA2 the compen-
sated demand curve through A, B2B1 the compensated demand curve through 
Band c2c the compensated demand curve through C. Consider an initial 
price of OH, where the consumer is purchasing HA ~nits of X. If the 
price falls to OH1 , the compensating variation is measured by the area 
HAA1H1 as Hicks has shown, 
Assume now that·the price falls to OH2• The amount of the 
compensating variation in·income, depends upon whether the compensating 
14 Winch, pp, 395-423. 
15Ibid. 
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variation i'Q. incc,me for the first fall in.price was.or was not .. removed. 
If the compensating variati~n was removed, the variation for the price 
fall from OH1 to OH2 is measured by H1 A1 A2H2 since the_.'..consumer would 
have been at A1 • However, if the compensating variatio'Q. for the first 
price fall was not, removed,. the consumer would have been at Bon the 
uncompensated demand cµrve and the compensating·variation fqr the second 





The Compensated,Demand Curves and t~e 
Norma.l.Demand·Curve 
I 
For th~ entire p~ice fall from OH tjo OH2, the extent of the 
COI\Sumer' s "gain", as Winch prefers to oall i~, is .accurately estimat.ed 
by Hick~ if the compensation is actuallr deducted but .if it is not 
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deducted, the gain is. underestimated by Hicks' .measures. · If the entire 
price fall is visualized as a. series of. small price falls, ,the con-
sumer!s gain·is accurately measured by the area under the uncompensated. 
16 demand curve, the original Marshallian measure. · 
The Winch argu~ent given above illustrates that the most accurate 
measure of a consumer's gain from a price fall is given by the· 
Marshallian measure of the triangular area under the demand curve. The 
assumption of a linear demand curve is made for expositional conven-
ience. Hicks also shows that the. Hicksian and Marshallian measures allow 
17 for a .changing .marginal utility of money. · In addition, he shows that 
the Hicksian measures assume an ordered sequence of the income and 
substitut~on effects whereas the .consumer's gain measure assumes they 
18 occur simultaneously. 
When gains and losses for individuals are aggregated, the~e may be 
either a net gain or a.net loss. This, however, does not tell whether 
the society: will or w:Ul not fa'7or tne redistr.ibution which will occur. 
If compensation is ac,tually made, then even.in the Pareto sense there is 
an inct'.ease in th,e welfare of society. In cases where compensation does 
not,. in fact, take place, a value judgment becomes necessary concerning 
the nature of the.redistri~ution involved. To avoid complications of 
this type, it is assumed in th,is study that society is indifferent to 





society favors. the new· distribution over the old I then the .decisicm 
favoring the fall in pric~ is reinferced, · 
Hotelling's.Contribution 
The first attempt to show the empirical possibilities of consumer's 
surplus for welfare problems was made in 1938 by Harold Hotelling. 19 He 
showed that anytime sales are not made at marginal cost there is a 
dead-weight loss to society. His measurement technique is the.same as 
that of Marshall and Dupuit. As Pfouts has stated, his rationale is 
simply that consumers prefer more goods to less and; at lower prices, 
more goods will be purchased. His argument, therefore, is restricted 
since he ignores the interrelat!onships among the goods in determining 
. 20 
the demand for a partic4lar good. Hotelling indicates that whenever 
rel~tive prices are distorted, whetQet by taxes, public utility regula-
tion or by other means, there is a dead-weight loss. to society and that 
the consumer's and producer's surplus concepts are useful in approximat-. 
ing that loss. He deals.exclusively.with market demand curves as a 
representation of the ,total utility of a collectioQ. of i~dividuals in.an 
ordinal framework~ Therefore, although his rationale does not include 
relat~d goods, his measurement technique does •. 
Loss.Estimate Equatiot1-s 
Having established,a theqretical base for the welfare los~ to be 
19 · •·. 
H. Hotelling, ''The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of 
Taxation and of Railway and Utility ,Rates, 11 Econometrica, VI (1938), pp. 
242-269. . 
20 . Pfouts, p. 332. 
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estimated in this study, attention is now turned to the deviation of 
formulae for the actual calculati.on of a welfare loss. The situation 
facing a profit-maximizing firm in long-run equilibrium is depicted in 
Figure 3. The monopolist determines output and price by equating long-
run marginal cost (LMC) with marginal revenue (MR). He produces output 
OX and charges price P ~ Constant costs are assumed.here as they are m m 
throughout this study. The purely competitive industry would produce 
output OX and charge price P. The restriction of output due to 
c c 
monopoly is thus OX -ox and the elevation of price resulting from c m 
monopoly is P -P • The welfare gain which could be achieved by making m c 
the monopolized industry one of pure competition is represented by the 
area of the triangle ABC. If, for simplification, the demand curve is 
assumed to be linear over the AC range, the area to be determined is 
simply 
(1) W •~(AB) (BC) 
where W denotes the welfare loss. lhis equation can be put in a more 
convenient form for estimation. Let the price differential AB equal T. 
Then the percentage divergence of the monopolistic from the competitive. 
T price level is p Let. this equal t. Also, from the definition of 
c 
the elasticity of demand: 
then AX -= x 
Since t T =-p 
c 
.A.!. ~ 
E • x x .. d p t A.x 
p 
x 
(2) or AX "' t X Ed 
AX :a BC in formula (1) 
(3) then T • t P • 
c 
Substituting from (2) and (3) into (1) and multiplying by a minus to 




(4) W • -~ X P Ed t • m c 
\ 
0 
n,-----,---X-------,_,......X __ .------------ X/U • T. 
m c 
Figure 3. A Profit-Maximizing Firm in Long-Run 
Equilibrium 
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This is only one of the forms into.which equation (1) can be put. 
21 However, for this study, it is the most convenient to use. Inspection 
21 It should be noted that, in Figure 3, P ABP is the amount of m c monopolistic profits and can be related to th~ area of the welfare loss 
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of equation (4) indicates that; the data needed to estimate the loss are 
(a) the monopoly output level, (b). the competitive price level (which is 
equal to the level of competitive costs), (c) an estimate·of the elasti-
city of demand a~d (d) the percentage·divergence of the monopolistic 
from the competitive price level (which, in this case, is the same as 
the percentage .divergence of price from marginal cost), 
Previous Empirical.Studies 
Before estimating the welfare loss resulting from the antisubstitu-
tion law, it would be useful to review some of the previous studies of 
welfare losses resulting from monopoly. In this way it would be 
possible to point out the specific differences between the methods and 
policy implications of this study and those of earlier studies. 
Har berger 
I 
Estimation of the welfare cost of the misallocation of resources 
22 
resulting from monopoly was first attempted by Arnold Harberger. He 
investigated seventy-three manufacturing industries for the period 1924 
to 1928. He selected this period because it was one.of reasonable 
economic stability in that it had no large shifts in demand or changes 
in the structure of the economy. 
Harberger used the average of the profit rates of these industries 
as the "normal" rate of return on capital. It was then possible to 
triangle. Since other studies have used profit data, their form of 
equation (1) has differed slightly from formula (4) above. 
22 Arnold C. Harberger, "Monopoly & Resource Allocation," American 
Economic Review, XLIV (1954), p. 77. 
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estimate the e~tent and direction of the reallocation of resources which 
would be necessary to equate profit rates among the industries. In 
finding this estimate, he assumed that the elasticity of demand was 
23 unity. Harberger found that a reallocation of $12 billion or l~ per-
cent of the total resources of the economy would need to have been 
reallocated to bring profit rates into line. 24 
Using Hotelling's formula for the welfare loss, he found a loss of 
25 $26.5 million for his sample or $59 million for the entire economy. 
This astoundingly low figure was less than one-tenth of one percent of 
national income. Harberger states that at every stage of the analysis 
an effort was made to overstate the loss. 
George Stigler criticized the findings of Harberger on two general 
26 grounds. First, Stigler argued that monopolists do not operate where 
their marginal revenue is zero and therefore that the assumption of an 
27 elasticity of demand of one was a poor one. Secondly, he challenged 
the accuracy of the profit data which Harberger had used. Both of these 
modifications would tend to increase the welfare loss estimates. 
Schwartzman. 
David Schwartzman accepted the challenge of Stigler and attempted 
23Ibid., p. 79. 
24Ibid., P• 81. 
25Ibid., P• 82. 
26 George Stigler, "The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger," Journal 
.2!. Political Economy, LXIV (1956), pp. 33-40. 
27 Ibid, 
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to find a new set of welfare loss estimates.28 He.employed.the same 
model as Harberger but he used estimates of profits which he had made 
for the year 1954.and he assumed an elasticity of demand of two. Assum-
ing an elasticity of demand of two and using his own profit data, 
Schwartzman found the extent of resource misallocation to be $7.2 
29 billion. Using his own profit data and an elasticity of demand of 
one, he found the extent of resource misallocation to be.$3.6 billion.JO 
His estimates of the welfare loss confirmed the findings of Harberger as 
being less than $234 million or less than 0.1 percent of national 
income. 
Kamerschen 
Some economists were still dismayed by these findings and would 
probably agree with Stigler's comment on Harberger's study that, "If 
this estimate is correct, economists might serve a more useful purpose 
31 if they fought fires or termites instead of monopoly." As a result, 
another attempt.to estimate the welfare loss resulting from monopoly was. 
made. David Kamerschen used profit data for the five-year period 1956-
57 to 1960-61. 32 He e~plains that;the facts that -these data were col-
lect.ed more recently than those .of the other studies and that 
28 · 
David Schwartzman, "The Burden of Monopoly," Journal of Political 
Economy, LXVIII (1960), p. 627. 
29Ibid. 
JOibid., p. 629. 
31 Stigler, p. 34. 
32 David Kamerschen, "An Estimatic;,n of the 'weifare Losses' from 
Monopoly in the American Economy,"-Western Economic Journal; IV (1966), 
pp. 221-236. 
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statistical procedures improved over time have resulted in his study 
providing a.better estimate of the welfare loss than earlier studies. 
Also, several other modifications were made on the profit data to make 
it better conform to economiE;its' ,definition of excess profits. The 
loss equation employed was the same as that of Harberger and 
Schwartzman. 
In addition to the new profit data, Kamerschen made a further 
improvement by attempting to estimate the elasticity of demand rather 
than assuming it to be one or two as had Harber and Schwartzman, 
respectively. Since his procedure for estimating the elasticity of 
demand is the same as.that used in this study, discussion of the method 
is deferred until a later point. 
Using his industry elasticity estimates and profit data, Kamerschen 
found that the welfare loss ranged from $20.9 billion to $26.4 billion 
33 or from 5.4 to 6.2 percent of national income. When he.used the same 
methods and assumptions as those of Harberger, a welfare loss in the 
34 neighborhood of two percent of national income was found. This 
difference was attributed to the improved data. 
This, then is the current state of the literature on estimates of 
welfare losses resulting from the presence of monopoly elements in the 
Unit~d States. It should be pointed out that, in general, the studies 
mentioned have all dealt with rather broad industry classifications, 
profit data were in all cases used as a means of estimating the 
misallocation of resources and were used in lieu of cost data, and the 
33Ibid., p. 233. 
34Ibid. 
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welfare loss estimates of these studies have ranged from extremely low 
ones (less than 0.1 percent of national income) to rather large ones 
(5.4 to 6.2 percent of national income). 
In order to complete the review of the development of the concept 
of a welfare loss and the studies to date on the subject, it seemed 
necessary not to interrupt the discussion with criticisms. Also, the 
assumptions were not always made explicit. The following two sections 
are devoted to these topics in order to give a full explanation of the 
ideas and empirical content of the previous studies concerning the 
estimation of welfare losses. 
Assumptions 
The criticisms often made of consumer's surplus as a welfare tool 
are many times directed at the restrictive assumptions which must be 
made. Therefore, most of the assumptions involved in the three 
empirical studies described above are listed below. For the Harberger 
and Schwartzman studies, Kamerschen has pointed out twenty-three 
35 assumptions. It is not necessary to reproduce the entire list here 
but instead only to give the most saliE;mt ones, especially those which 
concern the present research. 
1. All three studies assume that all production takes place at 
constant costs. This assumption was made for convenience since profit 
data could then easily determine the extent of the reallocation of 
resources necessary to eliminate excess profits. This assumption is 
35 David R. Kamerschen, "An Estimation of the 'Welfare Losses' from 
Monopoly in the American Economy'.' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Michigan 
State University, 1964), pp. 68-69. 
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also made in the present study because the nature of the production 
process as described in Chapter II gives all.indications of a lack of 
economies of scale. 
2. Harberger.assumes an elasticity of one, Schwartzman.of one and 
two, and Kamerschen estimates elasticities for the various industries. 
For the present study, elasticity estimates for the relevant drugs have 
been calculated. 
3. All studies assume the industries are in long~run equilibrium 
positions. This is also necessary in the present study to insure that 
prices and outputs are at equilibrium levels. 
4. Studies of this type must necessarily assume that whatever 
redistribution of income occurs is not a welfare loss. This assumption 
may alternatively be stated as one which provides that the marginal 
utility of income.is' the same for everyone or that fiscal adjustments 
are made to keep everyone's money income the same. This is not the same 
assumption that.Marshall made when he held the marginal utility of 
money constant. Constancy of the marginal utility of money was 
36 appropriately criticized,by Paul Samuelson and was shown to be 
unnecessary by Winch. 37 
5. It must also be assumed that all the industries are producing 
for direct consumption. L. W. McKenzie has shown that where interme-
38 
diate products are involved Hotelling's formula does not apply. 
36 P.A. Samuelson, "Constancy of the Marginal Utility of.Income," 
Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics, ed. O. Lange 
(Chicago-;-1942), pp, 7 5-91. - . · · 
37 Winch, pp. 395-423. 
381. w. McKenzie, "Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms," 
Economic Journal, LXI (1951), pp. 785-803. 
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6. In order to avoid complexities which would be introduced by 
second best considerations, it is necessary to assume that resource 
misallocations arising from exogenous factors are absent. F. M. Scherer 
has noted that second-best considerations are of little significance in 
the prescription drug industry because of its weak interdependence with 
39 other sectors of the economy. 
7. Ten of the other assumptions listed by Kamerschen had to be 
introduced as a result of the profit data which they were using. Since 
profit data are not used in the present study, these assumptions do not 
need to be made here. 
Criticisms 
Harberger has listed four principal reasons why economists have 
40 been hesitant in attempting to measure welfare losses. They are: (1) 
certain key parameters (elasticities of demand, etc.) must be estimated 
and may be sources of error; (2) second-best considerations are usually 
ignored and thus, recommended policies may actually lead to a worse 
situation; (3) rsdistribution considerations are ignored so as to avoid 
value judgments; and (4) some economists still are suspicious of the 
consumer!s surplus concept. In addition to these four general criti-
cisms two more have recently been added: (5) allocative vs. x-effi-
ciency and (6) unmeasurable losses or gains in welfare. 
39 
F• M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (Chicago, 1970), p. 26. 
40 Arnold C. Harberger, "The Measurement of Waste," American 
Economic Review, LIV (1964), pp. 59-60. 
47 
None of the above criticisms is without some value,_although the 
first-and fourth seem now to be the least significant. Even though 
some estimates of parameters are necessary, their estimation certainly 
is.importE!,nt in order to.establish some basis for policy •. The concept 
of consumer's surplus or consumer's gain, as Winch has renamed it, is 
now more well-d,efined and its positive aspects from the evidence already 
cited give the concept a definitive value 
. . 41 
Ignoring of second~best considerations is a valid criticism 
although its degree of seriousness has not .been empirically determined. 
For reasons st;:ated above, its importance in the ethical drug industry is-
likely to be minimal. Questions involving the redistribution of income 
are probably the most.pertinent. 42 However, as Winch has,disc~ssed, · the 
redistribution of income involves a value judgment. If society deems 
the redistributton to be good and the net.gain from the measurement of 
the consumer's gain is positive, the decision is reinforced. Indif~ 
fer-ence of society toward the redistribution and a pasitive net gain 
again suggest that the proposed policy should be implemented. Only if 
the redistribution is disfavored by society and the.net gain measu+ed 
is positive is there a question as to whether or not 'the policy move 
should be taken. Even so, policy makers will find it extremely useful 
to know the extent of the welfare loss from a misallocation of resources 
in making policy decisions. 
41 K. Lancaster and R. G. Lipsey, "The General Theory of Second 
Best, 11 Review of. Economic .. Studies, XXIV (1956-57), pp. 11-32. 
42 Winch, pp. 406-407. 
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X-efficiency Considerations 
43 Two recent articles have suggested that the welfare losses 
estimated in past 'studies have been too small. They have, it is 
claimed, assumed both·monopolist~c and purely competitive firms are 
achieving maximum output.from.a least-cost combi11ation of.resources. 
Harvey. Leibenste.in stated that the . costs of production may be signifi-
cantly above their possible minimum as a result of psychological, moti-
44 · vatio~al factors which he termed X-efficiency. Considerable evidence. 
is presented by Leibenstein.in-support of his-contentions. The accent 
is especially placed on the possibility of i~creasing the productivity 
of all types of.labor through the ."stick11 of·competition. To the 
extent t~at this sort of ine(ficiency is present, monopolists are pro~ 
ducing at higher cqsts than.purely competitive firms would be.· The 
argument also extends to the more rapid introduction .of innovations by 
competitive fir:ms over their.monopolistic counterparts.· 
Where losses from a lack of,X-efficiency are present, the welfare 
losses from monopoly calculated in previqus studies may provide .a 
serious underestimate •. This can.be illustrated by reproducing a figure 
45 used by Connor and.· Leibenstein and · labelled here · as Figut:e · 4. Assume 
that.the demand curve facing the monopolist is AE in Figure 4. 
His output and price are Oq0 and OM, .respectively. If the monopolist's 
43Harvey. Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs. · X-Efficiency, '' 
American Economic Review, LVI (1966), pp. 392-415, ·and William S. 
Comanor·and ·Harvey.Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency, X-Efficiency; 
and the Measurement .of Welfare Losses,·~ Economica, XXXVI (1969), pp.· 
304-309. . 
44 · Leibenstein, American Economic Review, .p. 352. 
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qo - q1 q2 
Figure 4. Welfare Loss with X-Efficiency 
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and the pure competitor's costs are equal to C, the extent of 
m 
divergence of price and output from the competitive level are BA= a and 
If, however, costs un4er pure competition are actually C 
c 
instead of Cm as a result of X-efficiency gains, then there could be an 
additional reduction in price of DB= X and an additional increase in 
quantity of .FE= q1q2 if the monopoly &ituation were changed to one of 
pure competition. As a result, the welfare loss from allocative effi-
ciency would be increased from A ABC ( the usual measure) to A ADE, a 
sizable increase; In addition, there would be a welfare gain from the 
cost reduction resulting from the increase in X-efficiency measured by 
the rectangle C BDC . The calculations of this study presented in m c 
Chapter .IV do not measure this additional welfare gain by cost reduc-
i 
tion, i.e., area C BDC , and thus, the computations will provide an m c 
underestimate of the."true" welfare loss when X-efficiency 
considerations are made. 
Although the present study does not.separate the two types of 
efficiency gains, it does take account of these gains with the exception 
mentioned above and they are included in the welfare loss measure. 
Since the drug industry has a purely competitive market and a monopol-
istic market existing side-by-side, the divergence of the monopoly price 
from the competitive cost.is measured by actually using the "true" 
competitive cost level as a base.· This, in itself, may provide a 
unique contribution of this study to the extent that there are X-
46 47 efficiencies present in the ethical drug industry. 
I 
46Ibid. , pp. 307-308 •. 
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Comanor and Leibenstein point out that this larger gain may more 
than offset any welfare losses ignored by not considering second-best 
Unmeasurable Aspects of Welfare 
One other criticism which deserves some mention i$ that made by 
48 Gordon Tullock, His contention is that ·expenditures by a monopolist 
which are used to maintain, achieve, or enhance the firm's.monopoly 
position result in wasted resources from a societal point of view. In 
51 
fact, he argues, the capitalized value of those expenditures, discounted 
for risk, would be worth more than the increased transfer (excess 
profits) the monopolist is trying to achieve. These types of expend-
itures can not, as Tullock admits, be accurately measured and their 
presence means that the estimate of the welfare loss made in the present 
study is, to some extent, an underestimate~ 
Elasticity and the Nature of Demand 
It was mentioned above that the elasticity figures necessary forthe 
welfare loss estimation of.this study are being estimated instead of 
assumed as was done.in all of the studies mentioned above except 
Kamerschen's. The nature of the demand curve facing the trade-name 
producer was discussed in Chapter II. The problem now is to find the 
estimates of the elasticity of that demand curve for a particular drug. 
Elementary microeconomic theory shows the relationship between 
marginal revenue (MR) and price (P) as 
1 
MR= P(l + E). 
d 
consequences and thus make policy statements derived from the results 
more tenable. 
48Gordon Tullock, "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 






If, as it is assumed here, .the firm is in long-run equilibrium and 
is maximizing profits, marginal revenue (MR) will be equated with 
marginal cost (MC). Therefore, 
This form of the estimating equation is the reciprocal of the Lerner 
49 index of monopoly power, This provides an estimate of the point 
elasticity of demand providing that price apd marginal cost data are 
available, Price, in this st~dy, is the price of the trade-name drug. 
Marginal cost is assumed equal to average cost and the generic price 
level is being used as an estimate of both since a generic producer is 
so operating under conditions very similar to those of pure competition, 
This estimate of the elasticity of demand certainly has its short-
comings, It would be preferable to have an estimate of the arc 
elasticity between the monopolistic and competitive points of operation 
on the demand curve. This estimate is based on a.single firm situation 
and becomes less reliable as the number of firms in the industry 
49 A, P, Lerner, "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of 
Monopoly Power," Review of Economic.Studies, I (1933-34), pp, 157-175, 
so 
If X-efficiency considerations are relevant then the monopolist 
is not actually in a profit-maximizing equilibrium position. His 
. marginal revenue is not equal marginal cost since his marginal costs 
are higher than those.of the competitive firms. The elasticity estimate 
will then be incorrect. 
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increases.51 However, this procedure does provide an actual estimate 
of the elasticity of demand which certainly seems to be.a more valid 
approach than merely assuming the elasticity of demand to be one or.two 
as some of the past studies have done. In.addition, the industry is 
narrowly defined in this study, a notable improvement over the estimates 
52 of the Kamerschen study. Also, the industries of this study are often 
composed of only one firm so that the estimates are further improved 
over the estimates of.elasticity for more "competitive" industries. 
51n. R. Kamerschen and Phillip P. Caruso, "Two Shorthand Methods 
for Estimating Product Price Elasticities," Metroeconomica, XVII, p. 
103. 
52 Kamerschen, Western Economic Journal, pp. 221-236. 
CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION AND QUANTIFICATION 
This chapter presents the actual measurement of welfare losses for 
the sample of drugs for which price and quantity information was col-
lected. A discussion of the sample, its nature and means of collection, 
are also included in this chapter. 
Applying the Tools to the Drug Industry 
This section organizes and sets forth the analytical approach 
appropriate to the particular market situation in ethical drugs. The 
market can be graphically shown as that of Figure 5. Figure S(a) shows 
the demand and cost conditions facing a large producer selling a 
specific trade-name drug. Figure S(b) depicts the demand and cost 
conditions facing !!!,'the firms which sell the generic version of the 
same drug. 
The condition of demand facing the producer of a trade-name drug is 
made up essentially of two components, First, there are those physi-
cians who prescribe by trade name thus allowing the pharmacist no dis-
cretion in filling the prescription (assuming an antisubstitution law 
is present) regardless of the prices of generic equivalents. Implicit 
within this component of demand is that a group of consumers will have 
their prescriptions filled regardless of the price, at least in the 
portion of the demand curve under consideration. This element of demand 
54 
(a) Trade-Name Drug Market 
XG 
(b) Generic Producers' Market 




is represented by the completely inelastic demand curve dT in Figure 
1 
5(a). The second component of the demand for a trade-name producer's 
drug is somewhat more elastic. This element is composed of price-
conscious physicians and of institutions (such as some hospitals) who 
purchase their drugs on the basis of competitive bidding or by govern-
ment agencies (e~g., the Military Medical Supply Agency) who follow a 
similar procedure. Consumers of the drugs who follow such alternatives 
as refusing to have their prescriptions filled or who "shop around",on 
the basis of price would contribute to this less than perfectly inelas-
tic portion of the demand curve. This component of demand is repre-
sented by dT2 in Figure S(a). As a result of these two components of 
demand, the total demand for a trade-name producers' drug is shown as 
dr1 + dTz which is the horizontal summation of dT1 and dTz• 
The cost conditions facing the trade--name·producer were discussed 
in Chapter II. To reiterate, his cost conditions are those of constant 
costs. Therefore, long-run marginal cost equals long-run average costs. 
The curve depicting this situation is labeled on Figure S(a) as LMC = 
LAC. 
The market conditions for producers who sell the same drug by 
generic names are pictured in Figure S(b). The demand curve facing 
these producers is downward-sloping to the right and·is labeled dG' 
This is very plausible since, if a drug is prescribed by generic name, 
the pharmacist can dispense any manufacturer's version of the drug he 
chooses and it is possible that he will dispense, at least to some 
extent, on the basis of price. In the event of competitive bidding, 
price again is a primary factor determining the choice of a particular 
producer. 
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Cost conditions for generic producers were also discussed in 
Chapter II. Those conditions were constant costs with long-run marginal 
cost equalling long-run average costs. This is labeled LMC = LAC in 
Figure S(b) since.the level of average costs for generic producers was 
the same as that faced by the trade-name producers. 
Since conditions very similar to pure competition are present in 
the market for a particular generic drug, the price and output levels 
are determined by the market forces of demand and supply. As indicated 
on Figure S(b), the price of the generic version of the drug is deter-
mined as PG which is equal to the ievel of average costs. The output 
level of all generic producers is shown.as XG. Therefore, 'the equilib-
rium price level of the generic drug is equal not only to the average 
costs of the generic producer, but also the the average cost level of 
the trade-name producer. The level of average costs for the trade~name 
producer is, therefore, also labeled as PG on Figure S(a). 
The price and output.levels of the trade-name drug are determined 
by the trade-name producer in the usual monopoly fashion. The marginal 
revenue curve associated with the trade-name producer's demand curve is 
drawn in Figure S(a) as MR.r· Assuming that the trade-name producer is 
attempting to maximize profits, he will equate marginal revenue with 
long-run marginal costs. The price and output.levels of the trade-name 
drug are thus determined as PT and XT' respectively. 
In order to describe the welfare loss resulting from the lack of 
competition for the trade~name producer, it is necessary to indicat~ the 
level of output and price which would prevail for the trade-name drug if 
the industry were one of pure competition. If the price level were bid 
down to the competitive level, it would equal long-run average costs. 
Given the demand conditions facing the trade-name firm, at a price of 
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PG the industry would sell an output of Xe. Thus, the resulting welfare 
loss, as described in Chapter III, is shown as the area of the triangle 
ABC in Figure S(a). 
The analysis described above obviously applies when there is a 
single firm producing the trade-name drug and there are many firms 
producing the generic version of the drug. This s~tuation is, of 
course, only possible in instances where the patent on a drug has 
expired. In the case of several drugs, however, even though the patent 
has expired, there still remain several large producers manufacturing 
and selling the drug under a trade name. In this study, when there are 
two or more large firms selling different trade-name versions of a 
single drug, each is considered a monopolist. In the presence of an 
antisubstitution law, this effectively is the case. 
Data Sources 
The data collected for this study can be separated into two 
categories: (1) data relating to the calculation of the welfare loss 
and (2) information relating to the effectiveness of the antisubstitu-
tion law in stifling competition. Both types of information were col-
lected via the same questionnaire. In this chapter, only data collected 
which directly relates to the size of a possible welfare loss is 
discussed, Information collected regarding the effectiveness of the 
antisubstitution law is covered in Chapter V, 
The Drug Sample 
As stated in Chapter II, eighty-six drugs are still sold under 
trade names even though, in many cases, lower cost generic equivalents 
1 are available. The first task in sampling was, then, to select a 
group of the eighty-six drugs on which to'collect price and quantity 
data for the State of Oklahoma. 
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In order to choose drugs from important therapeutic categories, 
total sales for each of the.forty-six therapeutic categories for the 
year 1968 were computed. The top ten categories, on this basis, are 
listed in Table· II. They are. ranked in descending order. Within these 
top ten therapeutic categories, an attempt,was made to choose drugs 
which were significant in their respective therapeutic classes. Since 
actual sales data for individual drugs is not available, the criterion 
used as an indicator of significance.was a drug's appearance on the 
Gosselin list of the largest selling 200 drugs by new prescription 
volume. In those cases where a drug was on the list by generic name as 
well as trade name, an effort was made to include the drug in the sample. 
Since pharmacists were asked on the questionnaire for both whole-
sale and retail prices for the drugs listed and for the quantity of 
capsules or tablets, an effort was made to limit the drug sample,size 
to a relatively small number of drugs which were significant in terms of 
their dollar sales. As a result,of this, only eight drugs were chosen 
for the sample. These drugs are listed in Table III. 
1For some .. drugs generic equivalents are available only at the same 




RANKING OF THE TOP TEN THERAPEUTIC CATEGORIES 
Therapeutic Percent of , 
Category Total Sales* Total Sales Rank 
Drug 
Antibiotics 471, 263, 039 24.6 1 
Hormones 177,400,107 9.3 2 
Ataraxies 164,180,741 8.6 3 
Analgesics 154,880,949 8.1 4 
Cough & Cold Preparations 120,582,054 6.3 5 
Cardiovascular Preparations 86,882,128 4.5 6 
Anti-Obesity Preparations 64,121,280 3.5 7 
Sedatives & Hypnotics 56,124,509 2.9 8 
Diuretics 55,467,744 2.9 9 
Antispasmodics 52,225,952 2,7 10 
*Derived from 1968 data in the National Prescription Audit, R.A. 
Gosselin and Co., Dedham, Massachusetts. 
For the first two drugs on the sample, tetracycline and 
meprobamate, there are, in addition to the generic version of each drug, 
three trade-name drugs available. As stated before, the manufacturer 
of each of these trade-name drugs is considered here to be a monopolist. 
For the other drugs, since there is only one trade-~ame version of the 
drug, there exists a clear case of monopoly versus competition. 
TABLE III 
SAMPLE DRUGS BY THERAPEUTIC CATEGORY 










3. Digoxin (. 25 mg) 
(a) Generic 
(b) Lanoxin 
4. Chloral Hydrate (7~ gr) 
(a) Generic 
(b) Noctec 
5. Penicillin G Pot. (400,000 U) 
(a) Generic 
(b) Pentids 
6. Reserpine (.25 mg) 
(a) Generic 
(b) Serpasil 
7. Dexamethasone (.75 mg) 
(a) Generic 
(b) Decadron 
8. AFC/Codeine(~ gr) 
(a) Generic 
(b) Empirin Compound/codeine 
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Each of the eight drugs selected for the sample is classified under 
its respective therapeutic class in Table IV. Drugs from the other four 
of the top ten therapeutic classes were not included either because: (1) 
there were no drugs in that category on which patents had expired and, 
as a result, there were no generic equivalents available or (2) generic 
equivalents were available only at the same price as the trade-name 
version of the drug. 
TABLE IV 






5. Cardiovascul~r Preparations 
6. Sedatives and Hypnotics 
The Pharmacy Sample 
Drugs Included on Sample 
Tetracyclip.e 







As far as can be ascertained, there is absolutely no.information 
available on the parameters of the population of pharmacists in the 
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State of Oklahoma. That is, nothing is known about what the response 
rates of pharmacists would be according to size of community, type of 
pharmacy, etc. Therefore, the queetionnaire requesting data on prices 
and quantities sold of the sample drugs and questions testing pharma-
cists'. att:(.tudes was mailed to every pharmacy in the State of Oklahoma. 
That is, a smaller mailing was.not possible since.unknown differences in 
response rates could not be compensated for. 
According to a li~t received from the Oklahoma State Board of 
Pharmacy, there are 832 active pharmacies in tqe State~ Of the 832 
questionnaires sent out, a total of 288 or 34.6 percent were returned by 
pharmacists. Some of the pharmacists were, however, unwilling to pro-
vide data on the prices and quanti~ies for the sample of drugs. As a 
result, data from only 239 of the pharmacies were available for use in 
calculation of the welfare loss. A copy of the table pharmacists were 
asked to complete is shown in Table v. 
A more detailed breakdown of the sample of pharmacists is portrayed 
in Table VI. By type of pharmacy business organization (sole propri-
etorship, partnership, etc.), the responses were reasonably uniform. 
The tabulated results are listed in Table Vl(a). Approximately thirty 
to thirty-five percent of each type reported. The reason for the large 
proportion reporting from the hospital pharmacy category is unknown. 
However, since their number is small, the results of this study are not 
unduely biased by this large response •. The "Other" category includes 
pharmacies which are held in receivership, etc., or pharmacies whose 
form of business organization is unknown. 
In Table Vl(b) the composition of the sample, as categorized by the 
size of community in which the pharmacies are located, is shown. 
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TABLE V 
DRUG TABLE FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 
II. PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING TABLE USING THESE SUGGESTIONS. 
Amount sold per month should be an estimate of the number of tablets or 
capsules, of the dosage size shown in parentheses, sold during an aver-
age month. ~ acquisition cost is the price you pay for the drug per 
100 or 1,000 (please indicate which). Retail price is the price you 
charge for a.specific amount of the drug (please indicate the amount). 
The source may be designated by a ,!i (from wholesaler) or an M (direct 
from manufacturer. Generic means a drug from a little-~nown, low-cost, 
brand-name producer .Q.!. a drug from a producer who sells by generic name. 
If you do not stock one of the drugs, please place a DNS (do not stock) 
in any of the columns. 
Estimate of Your 
Amount Sold Acquisition Retail Source 
Item Per Month.. Cost Price 










3. Digoxin (. 25 mg)·. 
a) Generic 
b) Lanoxin 
4. Chloral Hydrate (7~ gr) 
a) Generic 
b) Noctec 
5. Penicillin G Pot: (400,000 U) 
a) Generic 
b) Pentids 
6. Reserpine (.25 mg) 
a) Generic 
b) Serpasil 
7. Dexamethasone · (. 7 5 mg) 
a) Generic 
b) Decadron 
8. AFC/Codeine(~ gr) 
a) Generic 
b) Empirin Compound/codeine 
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TABLE VI 
COMPOSITION OF PHARMACY SAMPLE 
Sam;ele Res;eonse b:y: Pharmac:y: T:y:;ee of Business Organization 
Number 
Form of Business Population Responding Percent Response 
Sole Proprietorship 370 131 35 
Partnership 135 45 33 
Corporation 277 82 29 
Hospital 27 14 51 
Other 29 11 38 
(a) 
Sample Response by Size of Community in Which 
the Pharmacies are Located 
Number of 
Pharmacies in Number 
Size of Community Population Responding Percent Response 
Under 5,000 250 85 34 
5,000 - 25,000 228 95 42 
25,000 - 50,000 93 25 27 
Over 50,000 251 71 28 
(b) 
Although, according to this breakdown, the response rates were less 
uniform, there were not exceedingly large discrepanci~s in response by 
size of community. 
Welfare Loss Estimates 
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The technique for calculating welfare loss estimates for the sample 
of drugs, its rationale and development, has previously been estab-
lished. The computed results from the data compiled are now presented. 
There were three preliminary tasks involved in the calculation of 
the welfare loss resulting from each trade-name drug. These were: (1) 
the establishment of a single price for the generic versions of each 
drug, (2) the establishment of a single price for the trade-name 
version(s) of each drug and (3) calculation of the elasticity of demand 
for each of the trade-name drugs. 
A single price for the generic version of each drug was not readily 
available for a number of possible reasons, First, there are many firms 
producing each drug and selling it by generic name alone. In addition, 
some pharmacists listed as a generic .equivalent, trade-name drugs which 
were sold by small manufacturers and whose prices are slightly above 
the competitive level. The inclusion of these observations in the 
sample tends to overstate the competitive cost level and will, there-
fore, cause a slight downward bias of the welfare loss estimates. 
Second, some.pharmacies sell higher volumes of the generic version 
of a drug than others. Consequently, their acquisitions are larger and 
this is ordinarily accompanied by a reduction in the price per tablet 
or capsule purchased. The third possible reason generic prices may vary 
is that pharmacists provided data for only a single generic version of 
the drug, Therefore, different pharmacies sometimes listed different 
generic versions, i.e., by different manufacturers, These varied from 
a drug sold by a trade-name producer under its generic name only to a 
drug produced by a little-known manufacturer who sells the drug only 
by.its generic name. 
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To arrive at a single.price for the generic version of each drug, 
it was necessary to calculate a weighted-average price for the generic 
version of each drug, The weights were assigned on the basis of the 
volume of the individual pharmacy for that drug, The weighted~average 
price of each drug sold by generic name is indicated in Table VII, 
Furthermore, since it was found that there were varying differences 
between the price of the trade~name and the price of the generic-name 
versions for each drug depending upon whether wholesale or retail 
prices were used, weighted-average prices were calculated at both the 
wholesale and retail levels. The weighted-average wholesale generic 
prices are shown in column one of Table VII and weighted-average retail 
prices are in column two. 
Determination of a single price for the trade-name version of each 
drug was less difficult since the drug is manufactured by only one 
producer. However, the problem of different prices for the drug depend-
ing on the amount purchased was also encountered here, As a consequence 
of these quantity discounts there were small price differences reported 
by some pharmacies even though the drug is purchased and sold by a 
single firm. Once again, a weighted-average price was determined for 
the trade-name version of each drug. A similar procedure to that used 
for the generic versions was employed. Wholesale and retail weighted-
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average prices were calculated and are listed in columns one and two of 
Table VIII, respectively. 
TABLE VII 
WEIGHTED-AVERAGE PRICES FOR GENERIC VERSIONS OF EACH DRUG 
Weighted~Average Wholesale Weighted-Average Retail 
Price (dollars/tablet Price (dollars/tablet 
Drug or capsule) or capsule) 
1. Tetracycline .031 .081 
2. Meprobamate .019 .053 
3, Dig ox in • 0075 .017 
4. Chloral Hydrate .016 .044 
5. Penicillin G Potassium .020 .080 
6. Reserpine .007 .029 
7. Dexamethasone .045 .086 
8. AFC/codeine .036 
It should be pointed out that Achromycin and Achromycin-V are 
approximately the same drug and are produced by the same manufacturer 
(Lederle). One can be readily substituted for the other by a pharmacist 
even on a prescription written by trade name. Therefore, pharmacists 
ordinarily stocked only one of the drugs. Thus, in calculations below, 
the two drugs are viewed as a single drug and their volumes are combined, 
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TABLE VIII 
WEIGHTED-AVERAGE PRICES FOR TRADE-NAME VERSIONS OF EACH DRUG 
Drug 
1. Tetracycline 








.. :· Lanoxin 
4. Chloral Hydrate 
Noc.tee. 









Price (dollars/tablet Price (dollars/tablet 





















Empirin/ ~:odeine .0363 
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The estimation technique for the elasticity of demand for each 
trade-name drug, as explained earlier, makes use of the average prices 
computed above. The actual calculated values, using the reciprocal of 
the Lerner index, are shown in Table IX. Since the pharmacists' demand 
for the drugs is a derived demand, elasticity estimates were made 
using both wholesale and retail prices, These estimates are found in 
columns one and two of Table IX, respectively. E1 indicates the 
pharmacists' elasticity of demand for the drug and E2 the consumers' 
elasticity of demand, It should be recalled that Harberger assumed the 
elasticity of demand to be one. All of the estimates in this study 
show the elasticity of demand to be greater than one. 
With the above information and the total volume figures for each 
of the various drugs, values for all of bhe variables of the welfare 
loss estimation equations are present. The computed welfare loss. 
estimates for the sample of pharmacies are presented in Table X, 
Welfare loss estimates were calculated for both the wholesale and retail 
levels since it was thought that a different welfare loss estimate might 
arise at the retail level because of the profit-markup determination 
methods of pharmacists. w1 , .in column one of Table X, refers to the 
welfare loss estimate at.the wholesale level and w2 the welfare loss 
estimate for the final consumer. 
Because only seven pharmacies out of those responding to the 
questionnaire replied that they stocked the generic version of APC with 
codeine, the data on the generic price of this drug are probably not 
reliable. As can be seen from the wholesale welfare loss estimate 
calculated for Emprin Compound with codeine, there exists virtually no 
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TABLE IX 
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ESTIMATES FOR THE SAMPLED TRADE-NAME DRUGS 
Drug 1 2 
1. Tetracycline 
a) Achromycin & 
·Achromycin-V -1.387 -1. 978 
b) Tetracyn -3.608 -4.144 
2. Meprobamate· 
a) Equanil -1.474 -2.316 
b) Meprospan -1.189 -1.415 
c) Miltown -1.465 -2.404 
3. Digoxin 
Lanoxin -8.566 -3.609 
4. Chloral Hydrate 
Noctec -1.609 -2.066 
5. Penicillin G Potassium 
Pent ids -1. 315 -1.995 
6. Reserpine 
Serpasil -1. 231 -1. 946 
7. Dexamethascme 





WELFARE LOSS ESTIMATES FOR ONE MONTH FROM THE SAMPLE OF PHARMACIES 
W1 W2 
Drug (thousands of dollars) (thousands of dollars) 
1. Tetracycline 
a) Achromycin & 
Achromycin-V 6.119 3.519 
b) Tetracyn .367 .747 
2. Meprobamate 
a) Equanil 13. 540 7.842 
b) Meprospan 3.359 2.361 
c) Miltown 4.645 2.379 
3. Dig ax in 
Lanoxin .113 .901 
4. Chloral Hydrate 
Noc tee .389 .464 
5. Penicillin G Potassium 
Pentids 5,334 3.157 
6. Reserpine 
Serpasil 4.458 1. 729 
7. Dexamethasone 
Decadron 2.592 3.341 
8. APC/codeine 
Empirin/codeine .009 
TOTAL 40.923 26.442 
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welfare· loss from this drug, Many pharmacists stated that they .. desired 
to keep their narcotics stock.to a bare minimum and thus they did not. 
stock the generic version of the drug, 
Before proceeding to analyze the~e findings, two adjustments are 
necessary in order to calculate the annual welfare loss from the sample. 
of drugs considered. First, the volumes of the drugs estimated by the 
pharmacies contacted were for an average month of business. Each 
welfare loss was thus multiplied by twelve in order to find the loss on 
an annual basis. Secondly, the annual welfare loss computed via the 
above procedure is only for a portion of the total number of pharmacies 
in the State of Oklahoma, Therefore, assuming that the reporting group 
of pharmacies is a representative sample, it is possible to extrapolate 
these welfare losses for all pharmacies in the State attributed to the 
sample of drugs. Approximately thirty-five percent of the pharmacies 
returned the questionnaire while about twenty-nine percent returned the 
table of prices and quantities of drugs completed, In an·effort.to 
understate .the welfar.e loss, tbe larger thirty-five percent figure was 
used as a base for extrapelation on.all the drugs. The estimated 
annual welfare losses for 100 percent of the pharmacies are listed in 
Table XI,. Column one (W1) shows, the extrapolated losses at the whole-
sale level and col\,imn two (W2) displays the extrapolated loss estimates 
at the final consumer. (retail) level. 
The first apparent conclusion from the calculated losses is that 
the total estimated welfare loss at the wholesale level is larger than 
that ~t the retail level. It can be shown that the size of a calculated 
welfare loss turns largely on the difference between the monopoly and 










ESTIMATED ANNUAL WELFARE LOSS FOR 100 




(thousands of dollars) (thousands of dollars) 
Tetracycline 
a) Achromycin & 
Achromycin-V 209.791 120.656 
b) Tetracyn 12.580 25.620 
Meprobamate 
a) Equanil 464. 230 268.866 
b) Meprospan 115.167 80.936 
c) Miltown 159.242 81.567 
Dig ox in 
Lanoxin 3.879 30.895 
Chloral Hydrate 
Noctec 13.336 15.926 
Penicillin G Pot. 
Pen tide 182 .865 108.251 
Reserpine 
Serpasil. 152.844 59.296 
Dexamethasone 
Decadron 88.877 114.556 
APC/codeine 
Empirin/codeine .292 -------
TOTAL. 1,403.105 906.570 
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the level of average cost$. This dependence is shown in Appendix A. 
The ratios of trade-name drug prices to those of generic-name drugs are 
smaller at the retail than.at the wholesale level. This smaller ratio 
at the retail level results from the method of determining a profit 
markup used by pharmacists. And, as is shown in Chapter V, their method 
results in generic retail prices being a gross overstatement of the 
competitive cost level. Thus, the estimated welfare loss at the retail 
level is a poorer estimate of the "true" .welfare loss than the welfare 
loss estimate made at the wholesale or manufacturer level. 
The absolute dollar amounts of welfare losses lend little in the 
way of interpret~ng the results. Therefore, a.relative magnitude is 
needed. All of the previous studies concerning estimation of welfare 
losses have computed the welfare loss from monopoly for the entire 
United States economy, They then have used.Gross National Product as 
the base on which to compare the loss to consumers. Since this study 
is concerned with only a small portion of the U.S. economy, a more 
relevant base is that of the value of the total output of the markets 
studied or, in other words, the .total dollar sales of the trade-name 
drugs in the sample. It should be noted that the welfare loss estimates 
of this study do not includ~ the poss:f.ble welfare losses from the .other 
trade-name: drugs which have generic couni;:erparts nor possible lo.sses 
from the large number of other trade-name drugs which are still under 
patent protection; moreover, it must be stressed that these estimates 
are only for the State of Oklahoma. 
The amount of the total annual welfare loss to the State of 
Oklahoma resulting from the sample of trade-name drugs as a percent of 
the total sales of all tqe sampled trade-name drugs in Oklahoma is shown 
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in Table XU. On this basis, the size-of the welfare loss to the 
consumers of the State of O~lahoma is substantial at either the whole-
sale or the retail level. A seemingly unusual result from the table is 
that, at the wholesale level, the amount of the welfare loss is actually 
larger than the amount consumers spent on trade-name drugs, The neces-






ANNUAL WELFARE LOSS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL SALES 
Welfare Loss 




(thousands of dollars) 
1,377 ,736 
2,157,349 




consumers had to forego, possibly as a result of the current interpreta-
tion of the antisubstitution law, was considerable. Chapter V investi-
gates the presence of the conditions necessary for the elimination or 
modificatio~ of the antisubstitution law to be able to reduce or 
completely eradicate this welfare loss. 
CHAPTER V 
PERIPHERAL QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE ANTISUBSTITUTION LAW 
This chapter examines the evidence collected on the extent to which 
the Oklahoma.antisubstitution law is responsible for tbe welfare loss 
found in Chapter IV for the sample of trade-name drugs •. It more specif-
ically investigates the presence or absence of the conditions necessary 
for the antisubstitqtion law to be~r responsibility for the welfare 
loss.· In addition, this chapter presents the possible effects of a cur-
rently discussed alternative method of determining profit markups on 
drugs for pharmacists called the professional,fee, 
Generic Prescribing 
As stated previously, if all prescriptions were writt~n by generic 
name, the dispensing of a particular manufacturer's version of the drug 
would be at the discretion of the pharmacists. Therefore, the anti-
substitution law would be ineffect~al. However, this has not been.the 
case. The large drug manufacturers have apparently been successful in 
their promotion of trade-name drugs. Henry Steel states that," ••• 
surveys show that almost ninety percent of drug prescriptions are 
1 written by use of brand names." 
1 Henry Steele, "The Fortunes of Economic.Reform Legislation: The 
Case of tbe Drug Amendments Act of 1962," reproduced in U.S. Senate, 
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Thus, pharmacists must currently, in the case of most 
prescriptions, dispense only the particular manufacturer's drug as. 
designated by its trade name. The antisubstitution law, therefore, is 
effective in preventing competition among different manufacturer's 
versions of a single drug. 
Attitudes of Pharmacists Toward Substitution 
Whether or not elimination of the antisubstitution law would bring 
about price competition among different manufacturers' versions of a 
particular drug depends upon a number of factors. If the antisubstitu-
tion law were eliminated, each prescription for a drug, whether it was 
written by generic or.trade name, could be considered.a generic 
prescription since the pharmacist could fill the prescription with any 
manufacturers' version of the drug he chose. 
Information was therefore collected with regard to the attitudes of 
pharmacists in filling prescriptions. An exact duplication of the page 
of questions which pharmacists were asked to answer is contained in 
Table XIII. First, if a pharmacist received a generic prescription, 
would he fill it with the lowest-priced drug? Essentially, the attitude 
being investigated here is whether or not pharmacists consider the price 
of a drug when dispensing it t~ a consumer. Question two in Table XIII 
relates to this attitude. The total of responses to this question are 
listed in Table XIV(a). Of the 281 pharmacists who responded to this 
question, 107 answered that they would dispense the lowest~priced drug 
Select Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, Hearings, 
Competitive Problems !a, the Drug Industry, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1967, 
p. 1999. . . . . 
TABLE XII! 
ATTlTUDINAL QUESTIONS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE 
III. QUESTIONS 
1. Does your profit margin include: 
I I a percentage cost of the drug 
or is 
LI a constant amount per prescription (Professional fee 
system) used 
or 
L.J a combination of the two? 
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2. If you were given a prescription which was written by generic 
name, would you fill it with the lowest-priced drug? 
LI Yes /7 No 
Why or why not?~~---------------------------------------~ 
3. Would you always fill a generic prescription with a trade-name 
drug? 
LI Yes I I No 
Why or why not? 
4. If you were given a prescription for a trade-name drug and if 
,it~ legal lQ. substitute~ lower-priced generic, would you 
do so? · · · 
LI Yes D· No 
Why or why not? 
5. In those drugs which are usually prescribed by trade name but 
also have generic equivalents, does your inventory include 
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on a generic prescription. There were 135 who responded that they would 
not dispense the lowest-priced drug. It is interesting to note that 
thirty-nine entered as a response that it would depend upon what the 
lowest-priced drug was. Their responses were, in general, that they 
would dispense the lowest-priced drug consistent with, what they 
considered to be, acceptable quality. Many stated that generic versions 
of a drug produced by "reputable" manufacturers would be of acceptable 
quality. If this group of thirty-nine is added to those who would 
dispense the lowest-priced drug, the total is brought to 146 which is a 
majority of the pharmacists surveyed. 
A related question, which was asked of pharmacists, pertained to 
whether or not they would always dispense a trade-name drug when given 
a prescription written by generic name. This question measures, to some 
degree, the effectiveness of the promotional efforts of the large, 
trade-name manufacturers. The responses are listed in Table XIV(b). Of 
the respondents to this question, only seventy-three pharmacists 
indicated that they would always dispense a trade-name drug when handed 
a generic prescription. On the other hand, 200 pharmacists stated that 
they would, at least in some cases, dispense a generic version of .a 
drug. A variety of reasons were listed for doing so, including: lower 
prices, confidence in the quality of generic drugs, and profitability. 
The most important questions asked of pharmacists for the purpose 
of this study related to the willingness and ability of pharmacists, in 
the absence of an antisubstitution law, to substitute lower-priced 
generic versions of drugs for higher-priced, trade-name drugs called for 
on a prescription if it were legal to do so. The responses are shown 
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in Table XV(a), Out of tbe phatmacist$ responding to the question of 
willingness to substitute, 159 of the 272 answered that they would not 
substitute one brand of drug on.a prescription written for another brand 
of the same drug unless it was first approved by the physician. With 
the physician's approval, substitution is, of course, presently legal. 
Of the 113 remaining pharmacists, ninety-two stated that they would in 
most cases freely substitute brands of drugs. The other twenty-one 
pharmacists said that they would sometimes substitute depending upon 
their professional assessment of the alternative brands of the drug 
available. 
Reasons given by the pharmacists who would not substitute were 
mainly twofold. First, they did not trust generic manufacturers' 
products and, therefore, would not be responsible for their distribu-
tion, and/or secondly, they felt.the choice of a particular manufac-
turer's version of a.drug was to be made by the physician and they would 
not question that.choice. 
Pharmacists who stated that they would sometimes.or most of the 
time substitut~ versions of a drug gave many of the same reasons that 
were listed for dispensing the lowest~priced drug on a prescription 
written by generic name. Additional motives were also mentioned. These 
included: (1) trade-name drugs are "over-priced," (2) it would allow 
them to compete more effectively with other pharmacies, (3) it would 
permit them to exercise their professional judpent, (4) the profit 
per prescription filled is larger when the acquisition cost is lower, 
(5) it would enable them to reduce their inventories since·fewer brands 
of a single drug would need to be stocked, and (6) quantity discounts 
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TABLE XV 
PHARMACISTS' RESPONSES ON GENERIC EQUIVALENTS 
Willingness to Substitute 






Stock of Generic Equivalents 








could be achieved since they would be able to. purchase larger quantities 
of the fewer necessary brands of a drug. 
Reasons five and six listed above would likely alter the current 
composition of pharmacists' inventories. One of the questions asked of 
pharmacists dealt with the nature of their current inventories. They 
were asked to what extent they stocked generic equivalents of drugs 
which are usually prescribed by trade name. From question five of Table 
XIII it can be seen that the alternative responses were, for pragmatic 
reasons, rather broad. 
The reported composition of pharmacists' inventories is shown in 
Table XV(b). Of the 267 pharmacists responding to this question, only 
one stated that he always had the generic equivalent for a trade-name 
drug in stock. On the other hand, only seventeen responded that they 
never stocked generically equivalent drugs. The "usually" and "seldom" 
responses were reasonably close, 101 reporting that they usually had a 
generic equivalent in stock and 148 stating that they seldom did. Cur-
rently then, many pharmacies do not stock generic equivalents and could 
not substitute even if it were legal to do so. 
Effectiveness of the Antisubstitution Law 
The responses to all of the above questions asked of pharmacists 
indicated that the antisubstitution law is quite effective in blocking 
competition among different brands of a single drug. A summary evalua-
tion of the responses of pharmacists lists the following important 
findings: 
(1) Most pharmacists will not always dispense a trade-name drug 
upon receiving a prescription which is written by generic name, Thus, 
pharmacists apparently think they can, in most cases, rely on 
generically equivalent drugs from a quality standpoint. 
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(2) Almost one-half of the pharmacists surveyed would, if given 
the legal opportunity, substitute lower-priced generic equivalents upon 
receiving a prescription written by trade name. This would, undoubt-
edly, foster price competition at the retail or pharmacy level and thus 
encourage other pharmacists to substitute different brands.of drugs. 
(3) Over one-half of the pharmacists responding seldom or never 
presently stock generic equivalent drugs. Since the pharmacists' demand 
for drugs is derived from the prescriptions they receive, it would be 
expected that elimination of the antisubstitution law would have a 
significant impact on the pharmacists' demands. Pharmacists, in the 
absence of an antisubstitution law, could stock only those manufac-
turers' versions of a drug that they desired. Therefore, the present 
nature of pharmacists' inventories could be substantially altered and 
need not be a discouraging factor .in proposing that elimination or 
revision of the antisubstitution law would engender price competition 
among various brands of a single drug. 
The Professional Fee 
Earlier in this study it was stated that the method of determining 
profit margins used by pharmacists had a significant impact on the size 
of the welfare loss estimates at the retail level. Some evidence col-. 
lected on the method used currently by pharmacists is presented here 
and a widely discussed alternative method called the professional or 
dispensing fee system is scrutinized with respect to its impact on the 
size of the resulting welfare loss.estimates and on pharmacists'· 
profits. 
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Responses to question one.in Table XIII showed that most 
pharmacists use a percent of the acquisition cost of a drug as a profit 
margin to determine the final retail price of a drug although the 
percent used from one drug to. another was found seldom to be consistent. 
How phartllacists responded to this question is shown in Table XVI. Of· 
the 271 pharmacists responding, 140 used the conventional percentage 
of cost method markup. Only nineteen used the newer professional fee 
method while 112 employed some combination of the two. The average 
percentage markups for each of the drugs on the sample are listed in 
Table XVII, 
TABLE XVI 
TYPE OF MARK-UP SYSTEM USED 
Response 
Percentage of Cost. 
Professional Fee 
Combination of the Two 




The average percentage markups consistently show that the versions 
of drugs whose acquisition costs are lower receive the higher percentage 
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to bring prices of lower-priced versions of the drug ~ore into line with 
prices of higher-priced versions. The use of this procedure accounts 
for smaller retail price differentials and ratios among.different 
versions of a drug and thus, as was found irt Chapter IV, a smaller 
observed welfare loss at the retail than at the wholesale (manufacturer) 
level. The prices of the generic drug are being used as an estimate 
of the marginal costs of the drug which is the same for the trade-name 
and generic versions. The larger percentage markup on the generic drugs 
thus makes their retail prices an overstatement of the actual opportu-
nity costs of producing and dispensing them. 
The current discussed professional fee system does.not use the 
acquisition cost of a drug to determine the profit markup. Under the 
professional fee system a constant amount or fee for the pharmacist's 
service is added to the acquisition cost of each prescription sold to 
determine the retail price. With the data gathered from the sample of 
pharmacists, two investigations were conducted: (1) If pharmacists 
presently employed a professional fee of $2.00 per prescription instead 
of using the percentage markup method, what would be the effect on 
pharmacists' revenues, costs, and profits and the probable effect on the 
welfare loss? Question one actually refers to the use of a professional 
fee with no substitution of generic for trade-name drugs while question 
two views the probable outcome if there were free substitution and a 
professional fee was employed. 
Without.Substitution 
With regard to question one, a profess~onal fee of $2.00 per 
average prescription size was added to the acquisition cost of each 
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drug. Of the few pharmacists in Oklah0111a who reported that they used a 
professional fee system, this was most often listed as the amount used, 
Average prescription sizes were determined from the Task Force .2.!!. 
2 Prescription Drugs. The average prescription size for each of the 
drugs, the per tablet or capsule markup, the acquisition cost and the 
final retail price thus derived are shown in Table XVIII. 
It should be noted that retail prices including a professional fee 
are in all eighteen of the comparable cases higher than the retail 
prices which include a percentage markup as presently employed by 
pharmacists. Since prices of the drugs are higher and quantities dis-
pensed would concomitantly be lower, the area of the welfare loss 
triangle would be increased. This is in accordance with the view that 
the use of a professional fee system eliminates price competition on 
drugs at the retail level. This loss of competition at the retail 
level places an additional welfare loss on that generated at the 
manufacturer level. 
Since the estimated elasticities of demand were all greater than 
one in absolute value, the increase in drug prices would tend to 
reduce the total revenue accruing to pharmacists. However, whether the 
profits of pharmacists would increase or decrease depends upon the 
initial position of the pharmacists' prices and output levels, If the 
drugs' prices were initially lower than the profit-maximizing levels, 
then an increase in their prices would likely increase profits. If, 
however, the prices were initially above the profit-maximizing level, 
2 U, S, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Task Force on 




















HYPOTHETICAL RETAIL DRUG PRICES WITH PROFESSIONAL 
FEE OF $2.00 PER PRESCRIPTION 
Average(!) 
Prescription Size 








































































TABLE XVIII, Continued 
Average (l) 
Prescription Size 














































(1) Source: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Task Force on Prescription Drugs: The Drug 
Users (Washington, D. C., 1969), pp. 48-57. 
(2) The average prescription size for the generic is not listed, therefore, the average prescription size 
of the trade-name drug was not used. 
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the reverse would be true. To the extent that the lessening of 
competition tends toward a joint-monopoly solution, the profits of 
pharmacists, as a group, would likely increase. 
With Substitution 
92 
If pharmacists sold the same volume of all drugs that they 
presently do an~ free substitution resulted in the blendi~g of.all 
versions of a drug into a single group, it is possible that price 
competition among manufacturers would force all drug prices down to the 
competitive level as currently illustrated by the generic price level. 
That is, competition via substitution would cause the trade-name 
generic-name price differential to be.erased. The welfare loss arising 
at the manufacturer's level would thus be eliminated by definition, 
assuming that generic price level is representative of the true 
opportunity costs of sµpplying the drug. 
The impact of the occurrence of substitution and a professional fee 
system on pharmacists' costs, revenues, and profits can be seen by 
referring to Table XIX. Pharmacists' costs include only the acquisition 
costs of the drugs and it is assumed.that their other costs of doing 
business do not vary as a result of substitution and the use of a 
professional fee system of.pricing. The profit figures shown in the 
table thus only represent.a net of revenues over the acquisition costs 
of the drugs and are not a true accounting or economic profit figure. 
They can, however, be compared with profit information based on the 
data received from pharmacists if the other costs of doing business do 
not vary. The data shown in.the table are only for the sample of 











HYPOTHETICAL COSTS~ REVENUES AND PROFITS WITH A 
PROFESSIONAL FEE AND FREE SUBSTITUTION 
Average Prescription Professional 
Size of all Versions Fee Per Pill Retail Price Total Revenue 
of the Drug (dollars) Including PF (dollars) 
18 .11 .14 30,194-
41 .05 • 07 · 32.821 
62 .03 .04 8,639 
28 .07 .09 5,288 
22 .09 .11 7,952 
61 ~03 .04 3,495 
23 .09 .14 3,440 


























The data actually received from pharmacists, using the percentage 
of cost markup method and presumably no substitution, yields a profit 
from these drugs of $43,088. This obviously is a smaller profit than 
would be achieved by pharmacists if they used a professional fee 
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system and freely substituted. The sources of the increased profits are 
the reduced acquisition costs caused by price competition at the manu-
facturer level and the elimination of price competition at.the retail 
level via use of a professional fee system. 
Although the above situation would apparently eliminate the 
welfare loss resulting from monopoly elements at the manufacturer level, 
there may be a new welfare loss to consumers arising from tacit price 
collusion at the retail level. To the extent that retail drug prices 
using a professional fee system are above.the opportunity costs of 
supplying these drugs, this would be the case. 
The findings with regard to the retail prices of the drugs with 
substitution and a professional fee showed mixed results. The retail 
prices of the generic versions of the drugs, when a professional fee 
system is employed, are in every case higher than the retail prices of 
the drugs when the percentage of cost.method is used. However, for 
seven of the ten trade-name drugs, the generic version price including 
a professional fee is lower than the current retail prices of the 
trade-name drugs. 
Conclusions on the Professional Fee System 
The use of a professional fee system of pricing, with or without. 
substitution of versions of drugs, would serve to limit or virtually 
eliminate price competition at the retail level. To the extent that 
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drug prices are increased as a result of its use an additional welfare 
loss to consumers may be generated at the retail level. The fact that 
pharmacists' profits, with substitution and the use of a professional 
fee, are larger would seem to bear out the conclusion that the 
professional fee system is, in effect, a form of tacit price collusion. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The ethical drug industry is a highly concentrated one with a 
rather large competitive fringe of generic drug producers. The large 
drug manufacturers have, through the use of trade names for their 
products and relatively large promotional efforts, been able to secure 
a major portion of the prescription drug market. The smaller drug 
producers who ordinarily market their drugs by generic name have been 
unable to gain a significant share of the prescription drug market for 
drugs whose patents have expired. This is true even though their. prices 
are substantially lower than their trade-name counterparts. 
A major reason why competition among different versions of a drug 
has not developed stems from the presence of antisubstitution laws. 
Pharmacists, who possess the knowledge of different versions of a single 
drug and their respective prices, are prevented from using that knowl-
edge to promote price competition among drug manufacturers on drugs 
whose patents have expired. Forty-seven states, including Oklahoma, 
presently have antisubstitution laws. These laws were originally 
intended to prevent the substitution of~ drug for another. They have 
been interpreted and, in some cases, specifically state that~ brand 
.Qi!. drug ~ .£2.E. ~ substituted i.Q!. another brand .Qf the ~ drug when 
a prescription is written for a particular brand unless the substitution 
is first authorized by the physician who wrote the prescription. 
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The welfare loss to the consumers of the State of Oklahoma has been 
substantial, even on the small sample of drugs for which data were col-
lected. Data received from the pharmacy sample showed that the value of 
the consumers' loss for a one-year period was approximately one and one-
half million dollars on the eleven trade-name drugs of the sample at 
the wholesale or manufacturer level. This amount was just over 100 
percent of the actual dollar sales of the trade-name drugs themselves. 
That is, the value of the loss in economic well-being to the consumers 
of the State of Oklahoma was larger than the amount they spent on the 
drugs under consideration. 
The information collected on the attitudes of pharmacists indicates 
that.pharmacists do, in many cases, have confidence in drugs produced 
by small generic manufacturers. Over half of the pharmacists indicated 
that they would 1 if given the legal opportunity, substitute lower-priced 
generic versions of drugs when given a prescription written for a 
higher-priced trade-name version of the drug. The motives for being 
willing to do so were varied. They included higher profits and concern 
about high prescription drug prices. An important motive given was that 
substitution of versions of drugs would allow the pharmacies to compete 
more effectively on the basi~ of price with other pharmacies. Thus, 
even though many pharmacists would not presently be willing to 
substitute, the "stick" of competition may serve to encourage them to 
reassess their views. 
It thus becomes apparent that elimination o( modification of. 
existing antisubstitution laws may well serve to stimulate price 
competition at the retail and manufacturer level. This price competi-
tion would 1 in turn, tend to drive down the prices of trade-name drugs 
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and reduce or eliminate the large welfare loss to consumers which now 
exists. It should be recalled that the welfare loss estimate given 
above pertains only to the small sample of eleven trade-name drugs 
sampled. No mention is made of a possible welfare loss on the remaining 
unpatented drugs which have generic counterparts or of that resulting 
from the numerous patented trade~name drugs which have no generic 
versions. 
To re-emphasize a point made earlier in this study, it .is not 
recommended that pharmacists be allowed to substitute one drug for 
another. It is only recommended that a pharmacist be allowed to use 
his professional competence and the information he possesses to pru-
dently substitute one manufacturer's version of a drug for another 
manufacturer's version of the same drug. Thus, price competition could 
be engendered with no loss in the quality of the drugs dispensed. It 
would, in many states, require only a modification of the existing law 
to permit this kind of substitution. 
The professional or dispensing fee which has been discussed by many 
pharmacists as an alternative to the present percentage of cost method 
of markups was also investigated in this study. The findings with 
respect to this method were that, whether or not substitution was 
allowed, there would be an additional welfare loss imposed on consumers 
at the retail level. Pharmacists' profits would likely be increased 
by its use and retail drug prices would also be increased. It was found 
that the professional fee system represents a form of tacit price 
collusion which would serve to eradicate price competition on drugs at. 
the retail level. Therefore, the conclusions of this study are that the 
conventional percentage of cost markup method should be retained as it 
encourages price competition at the retail level and results in lower 
retail prescription drug prices. 
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Suggestions for further study in this area follow two general 
lines. The large welfare loss of this study seems to cast doubt on the 
small welfare loss estimates for the entire economy found in studies 
alluded to earlier. It is, therefore, suggested that other studies of 
welfare losses resulting from monopoly elements be made in specific 
industries to further investigate the validity of this doubt. 
Secondly, the areas for needed research in the qrug industry would 
seem to be limitless. Primary areas suggested would be in the area of 
the patented trade~name drugs and the international sales of drug 
producers, especially competition in the international drug market. 
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The importance of the difference in price between trade-name 
(monopoly) and generic-name (purely competitive) drugs arises from the 
method used to calculate the welfare loss in this study. The welfare 
loss estimation equati.on is: 
1) 
where: W = welfare loss 
xT = volume (in pills or tablets) of the trade-name drug 
PG= price of the generic drug 
PT 
PT-PG 
t} - (p!:p~ 2 
Substituting the expressions for Ed and tx2 into the welfare loss 
equation: 
Therefore: 
3) W = -~ l PT\ /p -P \ 
T ,- PG-) \T G) 
It is readily seen from equation (3) that the larger the price of the 
trade name vis-a-vis the price of the generic drug, the larger will be 
the estimated welfare loss. 
For the welfare loss to be greater than the dollar sales volume of 
the trade-name drug: 









-', !G q_;> 1 
or 
Again, the relative prices of the trade and generic-name drugs 
determine the answer. If the price of the trade-name drug is greater 
than three times the price of the generic-name drug, then the welfare 
loss estimated will be greater than the total sales of the trade-name 
drug itself. 
For the eleven trade-name drugs in the sample, using wholesale 
106 
prices, eight trade-name prices were greater than three times the price 
of their generic equivalents. This accounts for the estimated whole-
sale welfare loss being greater than the total wholesale dollar sales 
of the trade-name drugs. 
Using retail prices, only one trade-name drug's price was more than 
three times greater than the generic equivalent's price. As a result, 
the estimated welfare loss.at retail was less than the total dollar 
sales of the trade-name drugs. 
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